

# Social Impacts of Gambling in the United States

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## *A Comprehensive Analysis of State Regulatory Bodies, Legislatures, and Health Departments*

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## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Central to New Hampshire's decision on expanding gambling in the state is the social impact such a decision will have on current residents. This report examines how gambling regulatory bodies, state legislatures, and departments of health have addressed expanded gambling in thirty-four states. In addition to the findings generated from these contacts, this report contains a synopsis of academic research on the social impacts of gambling and how states fund problem gambling services, while offering policy recommendations to the Commission. Due to the lack of consensus on the social impacts of gambling, this report does not offer concrete conclusions regarding the effects of expanding gambling, but rather examines how states with expanded gambling have dealt with gambling-related issues.

Our research has found two potential social impacts related to expanded gambling: increased problem gambling and increased crime. Both problems have geographic consistencies and are generally concentrated within a fifty-mile radius of a new casino. Regulatory bodies that oversee state gambling vary in structure and power, as well as board-selection processes. The post-legalization involvement of these agencies, as well as state legislatures and health departments, also varies across states. Problem gambling funding ranges from zero public funding to \$2.50 per resident. New Hampshire currently allocates no public funding specifically to problem gambling.

This report presents four main recommendations for consideration in proceeding with gambling legislation:

1. Analyze the infrastructure of New Hampshire's Department of Health and Human Services to determine how gambling addiction services and treatment will be administered across the state. Work with national problem gambling agencies to start a local chapter of the non-profit National Council on Problem Gambling.
2. Determine how the state will fund gambling addiction services. This report contains a chart of how thirty-four states currently fund these services and shows that states typically allocate 0.25 percent to 2.0 percent of gambling net revenue to gambling addiction services and treatment. New Hampshire may wish to allocate up 2.0 of gambling net revenues to these programs to service potential problem gamblers adequately.
3. Consider the commitment of the state legislature to overseeing future social impacts. Of the states studied, only eight have committees dedicated to gaming, while only five of those have held hearings on the social impacts of gambling in the state. Many states have also passed self-exclusion legislation, which creates a database of state residents who have asked not to be allowed into casinos; New Hampshire may wish to examine the possibilities in replicating such legislation.
4. Commit to regular systematic collection of data on problem gamblers in the state, regularly evaluate publicly-funded programs, and track other long-term social impacts of expanded gambling, such as changes in crime rates and

## 1. METHODOLOGY

In this report, we sought information on the social trends (or “social costs”) that have emerged in other states as a result of legalizing casino gambling. We contacted the gaming commissions, state legislatures, and departments of public health or health and social welfare in all of the states that have legalized casino gaming. We asked leaders in each of the institutions to identify the appropriate agency, if anyone, in charge of monitoring the social costs of gambling, or any agency that may have taken independent initiative to do so. We found that very few long term efforts have been made to track the social costs of gaming legalization. Legislative committees have rarely held hearings, and the potentially relevant agencies of state government, although they do provide services to problem gamblers, have not conducted studies or undertaken any systematic data analysis.

Tables 1 and 2 in the next section of this report summarize these findings, while Tables 4, 5 and 6 in the Appendix detail the situations in individual states.

### *1.1 State Regulatory Body Methodology (See Table 4 in Appendix for Complete Findings)*

We contacted each of the state commissions/boards tasked with regulating gaming in each of the states under analysis. We found that the vast majority of commissions did not have relevant information. Since legalization, they had not been tasked with regularly examining the social costs of gambling and had not observed significant changes in their communities. These commissions focused on regulations, licensing, and sometimes tourism. Some of them worked in conjunction with health departments to provide outreach and support to problem gamblers, but they had not conducted empirical research relating to the social costs of gambling.

### *1.2 State Legislature Methodology (See Table 5 in Appendix for Complete Findings)*

In states where the Senate or House had committees dedicated to gambling or gaming, we contacted the Chairs and/or ranking members and asked them for information regarding any hearings on the social costs of gaming/gambling. In states where a dedicated committee did not exist, we contacted the offices of the Senate President and House Speaker and asked what committee(s) had jurisdiction and what hearings had been held. In most states, the findings are minimal. The state legislatures do have oversight over gambling, but their scope seems to be limited to monitoring revenue and debating potential new laws or restrictions. For example, the Illinois state Senate has a committee dedicated to gambling, but that committee’s most recent hearing on the social impact of gambling was in 1999.

*1.3 Health Department/Problem Gambling Treatment Programs Methodology (See Table 6 in Appendix for Complete Findings).*

Upon the recommendation of many of the state board officials, we attempted to contact departments responsible for public health and welfare in their states. We quickly found that programs are structured differently in each state; therefore, it was difficult to ensure that we talking to the “right” people or that we were getting a complete picture of the programs in that state. We found that in most states with legalized gaming, a portion of the gambling revenues (0.25 percent to 2.0 percent) are designated for programs to identify and aid problem gamblers. Programs are sometimes administered by the state, and sometimes by independent nonprofit agencies. Although these programs often keep track of the number of problem gamblers identified in their state, it is impossible to draw conclusions from trends in these findings. For example, while some states report slight increases in the number of problem gamblers once casinos were opened, the increase also coincided with extensive outreach to problem gamblers; such outreach efforts had not been made prior to the legalization of casino gambling.

## **2. FINDINGS**

### *2.1 POTENTIAL SOCIAL COSTS*

For the purposes of this report, we considered the most likely potential social costs of gambling to be increases in crime and in pathological or problem gambling in the regions where casinos are opened.

### *2.2 REGULATORY STRUCTURES*

To determine the social impacts of gambling in the United States effectively, we examined every gaming regulatory body in thirty-four states which support some aspect of casino gambling. Table 4 in the Appendix of this report includes detailed information about these regulatory institutions. Our findings indicate that there is great variance in the way states have decided to structure these sectors and divide responsibilities. Twenty-three states have formed a commission, committee, or board. Six states have created departments to oversee gambling, or placed the duties within a division under an existing state executive department. Two states have added the duties of gambling management to the existing lottery commission and added a new division within the organization. Oklahoma’s overall gambling infrastructure is regulated by the Office of State Finance: Gaming Compliance Unit, while each Indian tribe maintains its own gaming commission. Likewise, Oregon tribes have individual commissions, while the Oregon State Police: Gaming Division regulates the state’s gambling industry.

Regardless of the regulatory body’s structure, each has four similar duties: adopting administrative rules, providing licenses to gambling operators, collecting gambling taxes, and testing and approving gaming machines. Enforcing laws and regulations may fall under the specified gaming commission or is carried out by another body. Many Native

American tribes have created gaming control boards in accordance with the National Indian Gaming Commission regulations.

The composition of gaming commissions also varies by state. In twenty-one states, the governor appoints members for a specified term. These appointments typically come with stipulations regarding political party and political office. Additionally, the consent of the legislature is generally required. In three states, the board is comprised partly of members appointed by the executive branch and partly of members appointed by the legislature. Four states regulate gaming through a department, where the director is appointed by the governor. The two states that have included gaming regulation under the existing state lottery do not have additional boards and their director is appointed by the governor. Finally, two states have chosen to regulate gaming through existing law enforcement institutions—Oregon and Montana utilize the State Police and Department of Justice, respectively, to regulate gaming.

*2.3 GOVERNMENTAL MONITORING OF SOCIAL COSTS, POST-LEGALIZATION*

Despite many stakeholders throughout varying states providing anecdotal evidence of the social costs of legalizing and expanding gambling, there is still a paucity of comprehensive empirical research that would define the relationship between gambling and social costs at the state level. The mechanisms of state governments that might be involved in such monitoring, such as regulatory boards, relevant committees within state legislatures, or departments of public health, have not done so with regularity. Although some states have collected data on incidences of problem gambling, they do not have studies with representative samples that control for other potential intervening factors. Regulatory boards often do not have such a mandate or jurisdiction. State legislatures contacted during the course of this study, even those with committees dedicated to problem gaming, reported not having held hearings. Therefore it is not possible to conclude, based on the lack of systematic empirical studies undertaken by state governments, that legalization or expansion of gambling has had significant social costs; however, it is not possible to say that it has not as well. Nonetheless, in all states one pattern is consistent—none of the governmental organizations receives a mandate and/or funding designated to conduct research the potential social costs of gambling. We found that the governmental focus following legalization or expansion of gambling was on revenue collection and distribution.

**Table 1: Summary of State Regulatory Bodies, State Legislative Committees, and Their Monitoring of the Potential Social Costs of Gambling.**

Number of States With a Regulatory Body	Number of states with commissions that have reports examining the social	Number of legislatures with committees dedicated to gaming:	Number of hearings held that addressed social costs
37	1	8	5

*2.4 REGULATORY BODIES (SEE TABLES 1 AND 4)*

We found that different state governments monitor and react to social impacts with disparate forms of regulatory structure. For example, gaming “commissions” and regulatory “boards” consisting of several unelected officials that are appointed by the state’s governor, state level agencies like the Department of Gaming in Arizona and the Department of Business and Professional Regulation in Florida are indicative of the various approaches to gambling regulation. Depending on the state, the authority and specific role of the institution varies from issuing licenses, to setting the tax rate, to making recommendations to the legislature and/or governor, to enforcing state gambling laws.

*2.5 STATE LEGISLATURES (SEE TABLES 1 AND 5)*

State legislatures contacted during the course of this study, even those with committees dedicated to gaming, reported not having held hearings on social costs, post-legalization. Although some had held hearings, they were sporadic and often for seemingly political reasons. For example, the Illinois State Senate Gaming Committee was considering an expansion of casino gambling in 1999, and held a hearing allowing detractors to express their concerns. However, following the approval of the legislation, no follow-up hearings were held.

**Table 2: Summary of State Departments of Public Health/Social Welfare and Nonprofit “Councils on Gambling”**

Number of states with health department administered programs to address	Number of those departments that have conducted longitudinal studies on problem gambling	Number of states with state level departments and/or divisions dedicated to gaming and/or problem gambling	Number of those departments that produced reports on social costs	States with a chapter of the nonprofit "council on gambling" that provides services and advocacy*
19	5	3	1	31 (out of 34)

\*Source: National Council on Problem Gambling.  
<http://www.ncpgambling.org/i4a/links/?pageid=3283&showTitle=0#Affiliatepercent20Links>  
 All other data for the tables come from primary research; sources are listed after tables in the Appendix.

*2.6 DEPARTMENTS OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE (SEE TABLES 2 AND 6)*

Within health departments and other government agencies, we found no state that established or funded a department, commission, or agency whose mission is to monitor and research the potential social costs of gambling legalization or expansion. Rather, states react to increased demand for problem gambling services. According to the National Council on Problem Gambling, “2 million (one percent) of U.S. adults are estimated to meet criteria for pathological gambling in a given year. Another 4-6 million (two-to-three percent) would be considered problem gamblers; that is, they do not meet

the full diagnostic criteria for pathological gambling, but meet one of more of the criteria and are experiencing problems due to their gambling behavior.” Therefore, it is evident that, regardless of the lack evidence to define a gambling-social cost relationship, demand for problem gambling programs exists. With the exception of Arkansas and Colorado, who provide no public funding for remedial problem gambling services, we found that states earmark funds in the range of 0.25 percent to 2.0 percent of collected gambling-related revenue to fund remedial services implemented by the Department of Health, the Department of Health and Human Services, or some other department or division relating to public health. Although these programs keep statistics, these programs do not include long-term tracking of all potential social costs of gambling at the local level.

## *2.7 PROBLEM GAMBLING FUNDING (SEE CHARTS 2 AND 5)*

According to the Association of Problem Gambling Service Administrators (APGSA), the average per capita state spending on problem gambling services ranges from less than \$0.01 to \$2.50. Of the states studied in this report, twenty-eight have public funding allocated to problem gambling or legislation requiring casinos to donate a percentage of their net revenue to problem gambling programs. Five states have no public funds dedicated to problem gambling and rely entirely on nonprofit organizations to address the problems. Iowa has the highest per-capita allocation, with \$2.50 per resident, while California has the highest overall allocation with \$8,557,000. Fourteen states depend on a percentage of state lottery revenues to fund problem gambling activities. New Hampshire’s current funding allocation of lottery revenues does not include money for problem gambling (56 percent for prizes, 30 percent for education, 12 percent for sales/advertising, and 2 percent operations/management). For further information on how funding is allocated, see “Public Funding for Problem Gambling in the United States” in the Appendix.

The National Council on Problem Gambling operates a 24-hour confidential nationwide help line, with funding from individual and corporate contributions, along with conference and affiliate fees. NCPG also administers National Certified Gambling Counselor credential, holds an annual national conference on problem gambling, distributes problem gambling literature, organizes National Problem Gambling Awareness Week, and acts as a resource to federal, state, tribal, and international government agencies. Thirty of the states studied have a local NCPG chapter, providing these services on a more local level. NCPG and its chapters do not support or oppose gambling, as their “primary concern is to help problem gamblers and their families.” New Hampshire does not currently have an NCPG chapter and does not allocate funding to problem gambling.



## *2.8 ACADEMIC LITERATURE*

Of the potential social costs due to legalized gambling, the specter of increases in crime and problem gambling often receive the most attention. We found that the crimes studied as potential social costs are the seven Federal Bureau of Investigation Index I Offenses: aggravated assault, rape, robbery, murder, larceny, burglary, and auto theft. While many academic reports have sought to define the relationship between these crimes and gambling, studies reach a variety of conclusions. Ultimately we, as undergraduate researchers, found that the multitude of different conclusions reached by different practitioners in the academic community preclude us from making any authoritative characterization of a gambling-crime relationship. (See Appendix II for a listing of relevant academic articles and government reports.)

We also found that states rarely conduct or fund prevalence studies that could be used to identify the effects of increased problem gambling on the state or local crime rates. Yet the National Gambling Impact Study Commission “found that the presence of a gambling facility within 50 miles roughly doubles the prevalence of problem and pathological gamblers.” This finding suggests that a crime increase may also occur within fifty miles of a gambling facility. We found that states have not necessarily concentrated their efforts on mitigating problem gambling based on the locations of gambling facilities. Rather a designated amount of funding is added to the budget for specific departments or agencies that address problem gambling.

## *2.9 LEGALIZATION NOT REPEALED BY LEGISLATURES*

No state that has legalized or expanded gambling has ever repealed or downsized gambling legislation once it has been signed into law. In short, if gambling is legalized and becomes a source of revenue within a state, it is unlikely to leave.

## **3. RECOMMENDATIONS**

### *3.1 ADDRESSING SOCIAL IMPACTS*

While considering legalization, New Hampshire and the Commission may want to consider the potential for changes in the crime rates and pathological gambling rates in the geographic regions in which casinos may be opened. Although proof of causation between gambling and these social changes does not exist, there is theoretical and anecdotal evidence that it does, and research-based evidence has not disproven causation.

#### *3.1.1 INFRASTRUCTURE*

Analyze the infrastructure of New Hampshire’s Department of Health and Human Services to determine how gambling addiction services and treatment will be

administered across the state. Work with national problem gambling agencies to start a local chapter of the nonprofit National Council on Problem Gambling.

### *3.1.2 FUNDING*

Determine how the state will fund gambling addiction services. This report contains a chart of how thirty-four states currently fund these services and shows that states typically allocate 0.25 percent to 2.0 percent of gambling net revenue to gambling addiction services and treatment. New Hampshire may wish allocate resources up to the 2.0 percent of gambling net revenues established as the upper level in other states to these programs in order to serve potential problem gamblers adequately. We suggest asking: does the state have the ability to help problem gamblers? Does the state have the ability to track pathological gambling, identify increases, and address them if they occur? Additionally, is the state factoring in 0.25 percent to 2.0 percent of revenue to designate for problem gambling programs? We suggest that New Hampshire consider taking a three-pronged approach to problem gambling: reactive programs (treatment), preventative programs, and long term assessment programs (to collect and analyze data about the potential social costs of legalization). Therefore, it might be wise to consider making an allocation on the higher side of state averages, such as 2.0 percent of revenue.

### *3.2 LEGISLATIVE INVOLVEMENT*

Consider the commitment of the state legislature to overseeing future social impacts. Of the states studied, only eight have committees dedicated to gaming, while only five of those have held hearings on the social impacts of gambling in the state. Many states have also passed self-exclusion legislation and New Hampshire should examine the implications of replicating such legislation.

### *3.3 SYSTEMATIC DATA COLLECTION*

If casino gambling is legalized, New Hampshire is in a position to consider its priorities and values in relation to the practices of other states. Although officials in most other states said that they felt there were social costs of gambling, such as crime changes or increases in problem gambling, they did not have information about a potentially large impact that gambling was having in their state. As New Hampshire continues to consider legalization, we recommend that there be a discussion about this phenomenon, and whether it is important to the state to do things differently.

If New Hampshire decides that the social costs of gambling are of importance, it would be prudent to commit to regular systematic data collection of problem gamblers in the state, regularly evaluate publicly-funded programs, and track the long-term social impacts of expanded gambling. New Hampshire can lead the country in gambling-related research by making an early commitment to track social impacts.

## 4. APPENDIX

### 4.1 Appendix I. Primary Research – State by State Data Collection.

4.1.1 TABLE 3: STATE REGULATORY BODIES AND THEIR MONITORING EFFORTS

State	Commission Name	Date Gaming Legalized	Gaming Prevalence (ex: annual revenue, number of casinos)	Is any group mandated to consider non-revenue related effects of gaming?	Has anyone tracked those effects or produced reports on them?
Alabama	AL Racing Commission	Intermittent – open for some time closed, reopened	Primarily Native American bingo operations. Pari-mutuels (greyhounds and horses) are also allowed. Electronic gaming is not.	No	No
Arizona	Department of Gaming	Legalized 1993.	Twenty-two casinos: slots, table games, pari-mutuels, lottery. There is no roulette, craps, or sports-book betting.	See next.	Department of Gaming has an Office for Problem Gambling. Does not do research - provides services.
California	Gambling Control Commission (GCC), DOJ Division of Gambling Control, Office of Problem Gambling (OPG)	Prop 1A: 2000: Tribal casinos can have slots, blackjack. Cardrooms for 100 years, but regulated in 1998.	60 tribal casinos, 90 card rooms. Lottery and pari-mutuels. Fee-per-slot machine. Since 2000, \$5.1 Billion annual revenue	GCC: regulatory OPG: remedial treatment	No studies done on social impact. Political reasons are suggested.
Colorado	Department of Revenue- Division of Gaming.	1990	42 total. 2 are tribal. FY 2009: Casino AGP: \$735 Million. Not clear yet how much goes to state.	Division of Gaming-regulation.	Problem Gambling Coalition of CO.
Connecticut	Div. of Special Revenue	1991	2 Indian mega-casinos and lottery. FY 2007: \$750 million in revenue	General Assembly suppose to fund study every 5 years since 1991	In 2009, Spectrum Gaming Group conducted study for CT on economic and social impacts of gambling in the state. See article analysis grid.
Delaware	Delaware Gaming Control Board	1996- slots at racetracks. See below.	3 casinos	The control board regulates and makes recommendations to the GA	None

Florida	Department of Business and Prof. Regulation- Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wagering	2006	-Dept. of Rev. pending	Department of Business and Prof. Regulation regulates but no social impact studies	House Select Committee on Seminole Indian Compacts questioned Grinols on social costs. See article grid
Illinois	Illinois Gaming Board	1991	Ten riverboat casinos	No	Annual report does not include social cost research but does discuss problem gambling; has programs for problem gamblers.
Indiana	Indiana Gaming Commission	1999	Riverboat casinos, pari-mutuel, casino hotels, slot machines	No	Annual Report discusses problem gambling; nothing longitudinal.
Iowa	Iowa Racing and Gaming Commission	1995	14 Casinos/Casino resorts	No	No
Kansas	Kansas Racing and Gaming Commission	Legal in 2007	First casino opened in December.	No	No
Kentucky	Kentucky Charitable Gaming Association	2007		No	No
Louisiana	Louisiana Gaming Control Board	1990	Riverboat casino gambling a major industry.	No.	Works in conjunction with state attorney general's office and nonprofits to provide services to problem gamblers; one study conducted in conjunction with a think-tank that examined changes in pathological gambling rates.
Maine	Maine Gaming Control Board	2005	One casino – opened in 2005.	No	Tracks police calls from casino – findings demonstrate that they are no more frequent than other local, non-gambling related

Michigan	Michigan Gaming Control Board	1999	Three casinos in Detroit.	No.	No.
Minnesota	Minnesota Gaming Control Board	2004	Only “pull tabs, raffles, wheels, bingo” – no casinos.	No.	Annual report includes info about problem gaming.
Missouri	Missouri Gaming Commission	1993	12 Casinos Revenue: \$1.682 billion	No	No
Mississippi	Mississippi Gaming Commission	Casinos 1990 (some gambling in 1972)	Over 50, massive state industry.	No.	Partnership with problem gambling prevention organizations, no report.
Montana	Montana Gambling Control Division Department of Justice	1988	68 Casinos Revenue: \$422.82 million	No	No
Nevada	Nevada Gaming Control Board	1931	266 Casinos Revenue: \$11.599 billion	Nevada Department of Health	Not by gaming commission, some by DOH
New Jersey	New Jersey Casino Control Commission	1976	11 Casinos, Revenue: \$4.503 billion	No	No
New Mexico	New Mexico Gaming Control Board	1997	5 Racetrack Casinos, Revenue: \$258.08 million	No	No
New York	New York State Racing and Wagering Board	2001	8 Racetrack Casinos, \$947.28 million	No	No
Oklahoma	Oklahoma Office of State Finance: Gaming Compliance Unit  Tribes have own commissions (Comanche Nation Gaming Commission, etc.)	2005	60+ Casinos, 3 Racetrack Casinos Revenue: \$92.48 million	No	No
Oregon	Oregon State Police – Gaming Division  Tribes have own commissions	1984	9 Tribal Casinos Revenue (2007): \$598 million	No	No

Pennsylvania	Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board	2004	7 Casinos Revenue: \$1.616 billion 6 Racetrack Casinos Revenue: \$1.597 billion	No	No
Rhode Island	Rhode Island Lottery Commission	1992	2 Racetrack casinos Revenue: \$407.50 million	No	No
South Dakota	South Dakota Gaming Commission – Department of Revenue and Regulation	1989	35 Casinos, Revenue: \$102.26 million	No	No
Washington	Washington State Gambling Commission	1973	28 Casinos Revenue: \$1.6 billion	No	No Response
West Virginia	West Virginia Lottery Commission	1994	4 Racetrack Casinos Revenue: \$951.21 million	No	No, only fund compulsive gambling hotline
Wisconsin	Division of Gaming – Wisconsin Department of Administration	1987	16 Tribal Casinos Revenue: \$1.24 billion 1 Racetrack Revenue: \$34.10 million	No	No

4.1.2 TABLE 4: STATE LEGISLATURES AND THEIR MONITORING EFFORTS

State	Date Gaming Legalized	Gaming Prevalence (annual revenue, number of casinos)	IS there a committee dedicated to gaming and it's oversight? If not, does a specific committee have jurisdiction?	How many hearings have they held that heard testimony on "social costs," or non-revenue related effects of gambling?
Alabama	Intermittent – non-Indian casinos closed and then reopened.	AL Policy Institute estimates potential revenue , to be between 62 - 284 million. 6 casinos- 2 are non-Indian.	No.	None
Arizona	Legalized in 1993. Early 2000's regulation was introduced; tribes had bingo games for many years before	18 Native American casinos; exclusive rights to tribes in exchange for % of profits. FY 2009: \$86 Million	Not legislative: Department of Gaming serves regulatory functions.	They have released a report that I have summarized in the article grid.
Arkansas	Lottery, pari-mutuels no date certain. It's been a long time. Electronic gaming legalized in 2006.	2 pari-mutual casinos. FY 2006: \$86 Million	No- although the National Council on PG reports that AK spends no money of PG prevention/treatment. The FY 2011 budget will allocate funding.	None.
California	Prop 1A: 2000: Tribal casinos can have slots, blackjack. Cardrooms for 100 years, but regulated in 1998.	60 tribal casinos, 90 card rooms. Lottery and pari-mutuels. Fee-per-slot machine. Since 2000, \$5.1 Billion annual revenue	Gambling Control Commission (GCC), DOJ Division of Gambling Control, Office of Problem Gambling (OPG)	No studies done on social impact. Political reasons are suggested.

Colorado	Casinos , slots allowed. Legalizes in 1990.	42 total. 2 are tribal. FY 2009: Casino AGP: \$735 Million. Not clear yet how much goes to state.	State Division of Gaming, Problem Gambling Coalition of Colorado, Colorado Gambling Association. None are legislative.	No studies, although funding is earmarked for PG treatment and prevention.
Connecticut	See Commission chart.	See commission chart.	Div. of Special Revenue regulates but no studies conducted	General Assembly required to fund studies every 5 years although this does not happen regularly.
Delaware	1996 video slots at race tracks. Race tracks since the 50s.	3 casinos. Division of revenue does not have the numbers readily available- still attempting to contact the office	No- there is a “gambling commission” and a Delaware Council on Gambling Problems. They are not legislative in nature. I am searching for more info on the commission, because they do make recommendations to the GA.	No.
Florida	See commission chart for all available info.			
Illinois	1991	Ten riverboat casinos	Yes (for gaming – not for social costs specifically)	Last one in 1999 when considering allowing casino boats to remain docked.
Indiana	1999	Riverboat casinos, pari-mutuel, casino hotels, slot machines	No (state senate has formed a gaming study committee to explore changes)	Senate President/House speaker’s office unaware of any recent hearings.
Iowa	1995	14 Casinos/Casino resorts	No (Commerce Committee has jurisdiction in House and Senates)	Staff in chairs offices unaware of recent hearings.
Kansas	Legal in 2007	First casino opened in December.	No (Commerce has jurisdiction)	No
Kentucky	2007	Six casinos.	Economic Development, Tourism and Labor.	No
Louisiana	1990	Riverboat casinos a major industry.	Judiciary Committee has jurisdiction, according to Senate President/House Speakers offices.	Judiciary staffer unsure – not in past five years.
Maine	2005	One casino.	Joint Standing Committee on Legal and Veterans Affairs	No response from Chair.
Michigan	1999	Three casinos in Detroit.	Commerce and Tourism.	No.
Minnesota	2004	Only “pull tabs, raffles, wheels, bingo” – no casinos.	Commerce committee (checks revenue).	Commerce committee has info on revenues.
Mississippi	Casinos 1990 (some gambling in 1972)	Over 50, massive state industry.	Gaming Committees	No
Missouri	1993	12 Casinos Revenue: \$1.682 billion	House Special Committee on General Laws	No

Montana	1988	68 Casinos Revenue: \$422.82 million	Senate Judiciary	No Response
Nevada	1931	266 Casinos Revenue: \$11.599 billion	Gaming Policy Committee	No
New Jersey	1976	11 Casinos, Revenue: \$4.503 billion	Regulatory Oversight and Gaming	No
New Mexico	1997	5 Racetrack Casinos Revenue: \$258.08 million	No Committee, all tribal gaming	No
New York	2001	8 Racetrack Casinos Revenue: \$947.28 million	State Assembly Committee on Racing and Wagering	Yes, hearing on geographic disparity of funds, including social impacts
Oklahoma	2005	60+ Casinos, 3 Racetrack Casinos Revenue: \$92.48 million	No – All tribal gaming with little oversight by legislature	No
Oregon	1984	9 Tribal Casinos Revenue (2007): \$598 million	House Human Services Committee	No
Pennsylvania	2004	7 Casinos Revenue: \$1.616 billion  6 Racetrack Casinos Revenue: \$1.597 billion	Gaming Oversight Committee	No
Rhode Island	1992	2 Racetrack casinos Revenue: \$407.50 million	Special House Committee to Study Gaming	Yes, 2003 Final Report and Hearings
South Dakota	1989	35 Casinos Revenue: \$102.26 million	House Health and Human Services	No
Washington	1973	28 Casinos Revenue: \$1.6 billion	Labor, Commerce, & Consumer Protection Senate Committee	Yes – Problem Gambling Advisory Committee
West Virginia	1994	4 Racetrack Casinos Revenue: \$951.21 million	Judiciary Committee	No
Wisconsin	1987	16 Tribal Casinos Revenue: \$1.24 billion	Committee depends on bill, State Affairs and Homeland Security for general matters	No



4.1.3 TABLE 5: FUNDING OF STATE PROBLEM GAMBLING SERVICES

State	State Budget for Problem Gambling	Public Funding Source(s)	Per Capita Expenditure (Budget/Population)
<b>34 States</b>	<b>Range: \$0-\$8,557,000</b>	<b>Revenue percentage allocations, general fund, lottery, tribal contributions, fees, none</b>	<b>Range: \$0.00-\$2.50 Median: \$0.13 Average: \$0.36</b>
Alabama	\$0	No funding allocated.	\$0.00
Arizona	\$1,800,000	1. Tribal allocations to the State from casino revenue. 2% of the funds deposited into the Arizona Benefits Fund. 2. Lottery, amount allocated annually by the legislature.	\$0.33
Arkansas	\$0	No funding allocated.	\$0.00
California	\$8,557,000	1. Indian Gaming Special Distribution Fund. 2. Business and Professions Code, \$100/licensed gaming table. 3. Lottery.	\$0.08
Colorado	\$0	No funding allocated.	\$0.00
Connecticut	\$1,841,637	1. Lottery. 2. Racing performance fees at simulcast facilities. 3. General fund commitment from Dept Mental Health and Addiction Services.	\$0.53
Delaware	\$1,000,000	1. Proceeds of video lottery terminal: \$1,000,000 or 1% , whichever is greater, of funds retained by the state lottery.	\$1.16
Florida	\$1,801,310	1. Lottery. 2. Casinos.	\$0.10

State	State Budget for Problem Gambling	Public Funding Source(s)	Per Capita Expenditure (Budget/Population)
<b>34 States</b>	<b>Range: \$0-\$8,557,000</b>	<b>Revenue percentage allocations, general fund, lottery, tribal contributions, fees, none</b>	<b>Range: \$0.00-\$2.50 Median: \$0.13 Average: \$0.36</b>
Illinois	\$960,000	1. General fund.	\$0.07
Indiana	\$5,250,000	1. Riverboat Casino admission tax. 2. Fees on slot machines at race tracks.	\$0.67
Iowa	\$7,470,285	1. 0.5% of adjusted gross receipts from the casinos. 2. 0.5% of the gross lottery revenue from Iowa State Lottery.	\$2.50
Kansas	\$100,000	1. General Fund. 2. Bingo. 3. 2% of gaming revenues will be directed to the Problem Gambling and Addictions Grant Fund.	\$0.04
Kentucky	\$0	No funds allocated.	\$0
Louisiana	\$2,500,000	1. Louisiana Lottery: 1% proceeds to maximum of \$500,000. 2. Casinos: 1% proceeds to maximum of \$500,000. 3. Riverboat Casinos: 1% proceeds to maximum of \$500,000.	\$0.58
Maine	\$100,000	1. General fund. 2. 1% net revenue from slot machines.	\$0.08
Maryland	\$16,000	1. Lottery.	\$0.003
Massachusetts	\$1,210,058	1. Lottery: Unclaimed prize money and proceeds of multi-jurisdictional lottery game. 2. Set amount: racetracks.	\$0.19

State	State Budget for Problem Gambling	Public Funding Source(s)	Per Capita Expenditure (Budget/Population)
<b>34 States</b>	<b>Range: \$0-\$8,557,000</b>	<b>Revenue percentage allocations, general fund, lottery, tribal contributions, fees, none</b>	<b>Range: \$0.00-\$2.50 Median: \$0.13 Average: \$0.36</b>
Michigan	\$3,000,000	1. Casino fees. 2. Lottery.	\$0.30
Minnesota	\$2,525,000	1. Lottery.	\$0.49
Mississippi	\$100,000	1. General fund.	\$0.03
Missouri	\$485,000	1. Compulsive Gamblers Fund, determined annually. 2. One (1) cent of admission charge from excursion gambling boat.	\$0.08
Montana	\$0	No funds allocated.	\$0.00
Nevada	\$1,500,000	1. Tax revenue equivalent of \$2 per gaming machine per quarter.	\$0.58
New Jersey	\$956,130	1. General Fund – First \$600,000 of casino fines is credited toward this amount. 2. Assessments on off-track wagering facilities. 3. General Fund with a cost of living adjustment.	\$0.11
New Mexico	\$2,421,446	1. 0.25% of net win revenues at state-regulated casinos. 2. 0.25% of net win revenues. 3. General Fund.	\$0.32

State	State Budget for Problem Gambling	Public Funding Source(s)	Per Capita Expenditure (Budget/Population)
<b>34 States</b>	<b>Range: \$0-\$8,557,000</b>	<b>Revenue percentage allocations, general fund, lottery, tribal contributions, fees, none</b>	<b>Range: \$0.00-\$2.50 Median: \$0.13 Average: \$0.36</b>
New York	\$4,477,000	1. General Fund, not designated from gambling revenue.	\$0.26
Oklahoma	\$750,000	1. Lottery – unclaimed winnings. 2. Tribal compacts.	\$0.21
Oregon	\$6,197,680	1. 1% of lottery revenues.	\$1.65
Pennsylvania	\$1,500,000	1. Compulsive Gambling Treatment Fund - \$1.5 million or amount equal to .001 multiplied by the total gross revenue of all active and operating licensed gaming entities, whichever is greater.	\$0.12
Rhode Island	\$78,000	1. Lottery.	\$0.0737
South Dakota	\$244,000	1. Lottery. 2. Casinos.	\$0.31
Washington	\$779,000	1. 0.13% of revenue for lottery, horseracing, and games of chance 2. Tribal casinos – voluntary contributions.	\$0.13
Wisconsin	\$300,000	1. Lottery. 2. Tribal gaming grants.	\$0.05
West Virginia	\$2,000,000	1. \$1.5 million from racetrack, lottery, and limited video lottery 2. \$500,000 from table games.	\$1.10

Chart Sources:

Population figures from United States Census Bureau

<http://www.census.gov/>

Association of Problem Gambling Service Administrators

<http://www.apgsa.org/State/ShowStatePartial.aspx>

New Mexico Compulsive Gambling Final Report: July 2009

<http://www.health.state.nm.us/gambling/CGC%20Final%20Report%20-%207-23-09.pdf>

National Coalition on Problem Gambling: Fact Sheets

<http://www.ncpgambling.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=3397>

Washington State Problem Gambling Program

<http://www.dshs.wa.gov/dasa/services/opplr/problemgamblingprgm.shtml>

Problem Gamblers Help Network of West Virginia Annual Report: 2009

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4.2 Appendix II. Relevant Articles (Academic and Governmental Reports)

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## **PRIMARY REFERENCES BY STATE**

### **Alabama**

Alabama Office of the Governor  
Alabama Department of Revenue  
Alabama Department of Health

### **Arizona**

Arizona Department of Gaming - Division of Problem Gambling

### **California**

California Gambling Control Commission  
California Department of Justice Division of Gambling Control  
California Office of Problem Gambling in the Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs

### **Colorado**

Colorado Department of Revenue- Division of Gaming  
Colorado Limited Gaming Control Commission

### **Connecticut**

Connecticut Division of Special Revenue  
Connecticut Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services

### **Delaware**

Delaware Lottery Commission

### **Florida**

Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation - Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering  
Department of Revenue- Tax Research Group

### **Illinois**

Stacey Wilson, Legislative Affairs Staffer, Illinois State House of Representatives Gaming Committee  
Sen. Tracy Link, Illinois State Senate, Gaming Committee Member

### **Indiana**

Jeff Neuenswander, Indiana Gaming Commission Staff Attorney  
Ross Hooten, Attorney for the Indiana General Assembly Gaming Study Committee

### **Iowa**

Julie Herrick, Assistant Administrator of the Gambling Commission  
Mark Vanderlinden, Program Coordinator, Iowa Department of Public Health Problem Gambling Program

**Kansas**

Mike Deines, Director of Communications and Responsible Gambling, Kansas Racing and Gambling Commission

House Committee on Judiciary, Office of Lance Kinzer, Chairperson

Senate Committees on Judiciary Office of Tim Owens, Chairperson

**Kentucky**

Leah Cooper Boggs, Treasurer of the Kentucky Charitable Gaming Association

Office of Sen. Larry Clark – Economic Development and Tourism Joint Committee

**Louisiana**

Katie Chabert, Louisiana Attorney General's Gambling Treatment Referral Program

Natalie Thurman, Executive Staff Officer, Louisiana Gaming Control Board.

*Stacy DeLaney*, Secretary, Louisiana State Senate Judiciary Committee

**Maine**

Department of Public Safety Gambling Control Board - Rob Welch, Executive Director

Rep. Pamela Jabar Trinward (D-Waterville), Chair – House Veterans and Legal Affairs

Sen. Nancy B. Sullivan (D-York County), Chair – Senate Veterans and Legal Affairs

**Michigan**

Eric Esh, Committee Clerk, Michigan State House – Tourism Committee, Senate – Commerce and Tourism

Jim Plaks, Michigan Gaming Control Board

**Minnesota**

Staff member, Minnesota Gambling Control Board

Commerce and Labor, Office of Rep. Joe Atkins

**Mississippi**

Rep. Bobby Moak, Chairman, State House Gaming Committee

Sen. Gary Tollison, Chairman State Senate – Judiciary Committee, Division B

Leigh Ann Wilkins, Mississippi Gaming Commission, Communications Department

<http://www.ncpgambling.org/i4a/links/?pageid=3283&showTitle=0#Affiliate%20Links>

**Missouri**

Missouri Gaming Commission Communications Office

Representative Timothy Jones' Office, Chairman of House Special Committee on General Laws

**Montana**

Rick Ask – Montana Gaming Control Division, Administrator

**Nevada**

Marc Warren – Senior Research Specialist for Nevada Gaming Control Board  
State of Nevada Office of Governor Jim Gibbons  
Nevada Department of Health and Human Services – Director’s Office  
<http://dhhs.nv.gov/>

**New Jersey**

New Jersey Casino Control Commission Office of Communications  
Risa Martinez Kruger – Regulatory Oversight and Gaming Commission  
Donna Pasqualine – New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services  
Dennis Donovan – Department of Human Services, Division of Addiction Services  
Jeff Beck – New Jersey Council on Compulsive Gambling

**New Mexico**

Georgene Lewis – New Mexico Gaming Control Board State Gaming Representative  
Tracey Kimball – New Mexico Legislative Services State Librarian  
Deborah Busemeyer – Department of Health Communications Director  
<http://www.health.state.nm.us/gambling.shtml>

**New York**

New York State Racing and Wagering Board Public Information  
Hasna Kaddo – Principal Clerk at New York State Racing and Wagering Board  
New York State Assembly Committee on Racing and Wagering  
New York State Library Research  
Rebecca Martel – New York State Office of Alcoholism and Substance Abuse Services  
New York State Mental Health Office

**Oklahoma**

Mia Monenerkit – Director of Compliance, Comanche Nation Gaming Commission  
Jennifer Brock – Oklahoma State Senate Communications Specialist  
Brad Wolgamott – Oklahoma House of Representatives Senior Research Analyst  
Pam Williams – Oklahoma Department of Health  
Jeff Dismute – Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse

**Oregon**

Carolyn Engler – Oregon State Police Gaming Division Office Specialist II  
Kirk Harvey – Oregon Department of Justice  
Sandy Thiele-Cirka – Oregon Senate Human Services Committee Administrator  
Paul D. Potter - Addictions and Mental Health Division Problem Gambling Services  
Manager  
<http://www.oregon.gov/DHS/addiction/gambling.shtml>

**Pennsylvania**

Nanette Horner – Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board, Director of Compulsive and  
Problem Gambling  
Pennsylvania House Gaming Oversight Committee

**Rhode Island**

Tom Evans – Rhode Island State Library State Librarian

Terry Kiernan – Rhode Island Lottery

**South Dakota**

Terry Porter – South Dakota Gaming Commission Pari-Mutuel Auditor

David Ortbahn – South Dakota Legislative Services

**Washington**

Kathleen Buckley – Washington State Legislature

Evergreen Council on Problem Gambling: <http://www.evergreencpg.org/>

**West Virginia**

West Virginia Lottery Commission

West Virginia House Judiciary Committee Communication s

**Wisconsin**

Peggy Hendrickson – Wisconsin Division of Gaming Public Record Coordinator

Executive Staff Assistant

Wisconsin State Library Database

Jamie McCarville – Bureau of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services Program

Coordinator