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Compendium
Superior Court Cases

Miscellaneous Appeals
I. Substance Abuse Completion Requirements VI. Fraudulent Activities/Prohibitions XI. Under Twenty Hearings
II. Persons Hazardous to Public Safety VII. Reciprocity XII. School Bus Cerificate
III. Medical Impairment VIII. Uninsured Accidents XIII. Fee Waiver
IV. CHINS IX. Fatal Crash XIV. Boating
V. Uniform Point System Suspension X. False Statement XV. Vehicle Registration
 
I. Substance Abuse Completion Requirements
Carcia v, Beecher, 05-E-255, (Strafford, Fauver, 01/31/06) REMANDED
Referred to further counseling by Program or Counselor and suspension was sustained after hearing. Petitioner argued that she was not given the opportunity to present her case at hearing. Because of possible reliance on erroneous information Court found that even though findings are presumed prima facie lawful and reasonable, Hearings Examiner may have had incorrect or incomplete information and wanted to give Petitioner opportunity to explain.
Reyno v. Beecher, 05-E-603,(Merrimack, Fitzgerald, 01/18/06) AFFIRMED
Referred to further counseling by LADAC; suspension sustained after hearing with conflicting testimony from more than one LADAC. Program disagreed with LADAC. Hearings Examiner held that Petitioner must follow program's recommendation. Court affirmed in a short one-line opinion.
Cesati v. Beecher, 05-E-232,(Rockingham, McHugh, 09/11/05) AFFIRMED
Referred to further counseling by LADAC; completed counseling with non-LADAC; was again denied; Hearings Examiner held second hearing with LADAC eval; program disagreed with LADAC; H.E. followed program's recommendation. Petitioner disagreed; appeal filed; HELD: "The Hearings Examiner's decision was reasonable."
Bastille v. Beecher, 05-E-055,(Rockingham, McHugh, 04/27/05) AFFIRMED
Referred to further counseling, suspension was sustained after hearing with conflicting LDACs. Director ordered counseling. Court ordered Petitioner to submit to a new LDAC evaluation. Evidence was sufficient to sustain order, but time was up and court ordered restoration after it reviewed additional submissions by petitioner about two weeks later.
Keskula v. Beecher, 04-E-142, (Merrimack, Lewis, 07/19/04) AFFIRMED
Referred to further counseling by LADAC; Petitioned for, and after a hearing, Hearings Examiner entered as his disposition the indefinite suspension of Petitioner's driving privileges and further directed that he attend 90 self-held group meetings in 90 days, and securing a low-risk alcohol evaluation from a LADAC …; Petitioner disagreed; appeal filed; HELD: "The Hearings Examiner acted within his discretion in making the rulings and determinations … There is ample support for the conclusion that the required aftercare was warranted in this case."
Gregoire v. Beecher, 04-E-0063, (Strafford, Smukler, 07/07/04) AFFIRMED
Referred to further counseling; did not comply and at a hearing, the Hearings Examiner ordered Petitioner to show compliance; Petitioner argues that although the examiner was correct in reaching the foregoing conclusions based on the evidence before him, the evidence upon which he relied was inaccurate. HELD: Petitioner has not met his burden of demonstrating that the examiner's decision was unreasonable or unlawful. "The Court … may not second-guess the examiner's reliance on the reports or his determination, as to what weight and credibility to assign them."
Oeser v. Beecher, 02-E-50, (Cheshire, Groff, 8/19/02) AFFIRMED
After a hearing ordering aftercare, Petitioner appealed raising "the following five issues on appeal: (1) …sentence has been served and her license must be restored; (2) … was not granted a hearing; (3) … license must be reinstated after 1-year; (4) hearing violated … right to due process and the DOS regulations; (5) … counselor is unqualified and the tests used … to determine her risk of re-offending were unreliable." Court held: "clearly the statute provides for continued revocation of the license of a person convicted of a DWI offense beyond the 1-yr period, if the person fails to meet the further counseling requirements. The Court finds that there is no evidence the hearings officer failed to follow the departmental regulations in the conduct of the hearing, or failed to give … a full and fair hearing in complete accord with all constitutional requirements of due process. Finally, the Court finds that … has failed to establish as a matter of law that the counselor was unqualified or that the tests were unreliable. The Court finds that the hearings officer's acceptance of the counselor's opinions and recommendations for treatment were reasonable."
Riddle v. Beecher, 00-E-248, (Rockingham, Coffey, 9/28/01) AFFIRMED
Referred to further counseling, "CADAC … submitted petitioner's treatment records with a request for an administrative hearing"; "at the hearing, petitioner orally revoked his consent to have his treatment records disclosed … specifically to the Bureau of Hearings.";Hearings Examiner denied petitioner's oral revocation of consent at the hearings as too late. Court held: "Petitioner did sign a consent form … when he began the IDIP Program. The consent form met all the required elements of 42 C.F.R. Section 2.31 (a)." "The Hearings Examiner's ruling that Petitioner's revocation of consent was untimely is legally sound."
Ferris v. Beecher, 01-E-42, (Strafford, Mohl, 4/6/01) AFFIRMED
Referred to further counseling by CADAC; after hearing the Hearings Examiner agreed with the CADAC and concluded that petitioner's alcohol abuse problem was not under control and that he was at risk to be a repeat DWI offender; appeal filed; petitioner considers himself only a "problem drinker" and argues that his test scores were inaccurate because he answered the questions based on his life style habits in 1998 as opposed to the present, as directed to do by the CADAC. The Court held: once petitioner demonstrates compliance with the program and is not at risk to recidivate, he can then petition to be decertified as an Habitual Offender.
Searles v. Beecher, 96-E-284, (ND Hillsborough, Groff, 10/30/96) AFFIRMED
Referred to further counseling; did not comply. After hearing, the Hearings Examiner ordered plaintiff to show compliance for 4 months; court stated "it is difficult to specify any statutory or constitutional grounds upon which petitioner could or does base his claims. It appears that he claims in general that his conviction for DWI and his loss of license were unfair and that the requirement that he undergo counseling for four months … is unfair"; court concluded that "the hearings officer has followed all statutory and regulatory requirements and the record amply supports the reasonableness of his decision".
Halamoutis v. Beecher, 96-E-121, (Rockingham, Murphy, 9/19/96) AFFIRMED
Referred to further counseling; did not comply and remained suspended. Hearings Examiner ordered plaintiff to show compliance; appeal filed; plaintiff claimed that he completed part of an alternative program and was in substantial compliance; court held that "the plaintiff has presented nothing to suggest that the decision of the hearings officer was contrary to law or required unreasonable conditions upon the plaintiff whose objection to the officer's decision appears to be based more on his concern for the inconvenience resulting to him than the interests of public safety".
Baron v. Beecher, 96-E-33, (Belknap, McHugh, 8/30/96) AFFIRMED
Referred to further counseling; did not comply and remained suspended. Hearings Examiner ordered plaintiff to show compliance or obtain second opinion; appeal filed; plaintiff claimed that his evaluation was unfair and he had a personality conflict with evaluator; plaintiff refused to get second opinion when he found out they would have access to first evaluation and perhaps be tainted; court held that there was no way plaintiff could prevent evaluator from obtaining access to all or part of earlier records in order to ascertain procedural history; "this Court is unaware as to exactly what an evaluating agency needs in terms of records before an evaluation can be done. It may well be that the new agency that the plaintiff selects will gain access to some or all of his past records. However, this Court orders that the new agency do an independent evaluation of the plaintiff and not be bound by any past opinions of other agencies".
Grant v. Turner, 94-E-130, (ND Hillsborough, Groff, 6/6/94) AFFIRMED
Referred to further counseling by Amethyst Foundation, Inc.; did not comply and remained suspended. Hearings Examiner ordered plaintiff to show compliance and essentially followed recommendations of CADAC; plaintiff obtained second opinion from a doctor who was not a CADAC; Amethyst Foundation rejected that opinion; appeal filed; plaintiff argued that he should be entitled to a de novo hearing as provided in RSA 263:75, the ALS appeal statute; court held that "RSA 263:75 is clearly not applicable in this case. This case does not involve an administrative revocation under the implied consent law. It involves the reinstating of a license revoked for a conviction for DWI. RSA 265:91-b and thus RSA 263:75 has no application"; court stated that plaintiff failed to show that order was unjust or unreasonable.
Lavallee v. Turner, 93-E-549, (Rockingham, McHugh, 2/3/94) AFFIRMED
Referred to further counseling by REAP; plaintiff disagreed with recommended course of treatment and remained suspended. Hearings Examiner ordered plaintiff to show compliance and essentially followed recommendations of CADAC; appeal filed; "this Court is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that of the Division of Motor Vehicles"; "the Court cannot say as a matter of law that the REAP program recommendation is erroneous and has no basis in fact".
Arnold v. Turner, 93-E-336, (Rockingham, Hollman, 8/26/93) AFFIRMED
Referred to further counseling by Amethyst Foundation, Inc. and did not comply; Hearings Examiner ordered plaintiff to show compliance and essentially follow recommendations of CADAC; allowed plaintiff to come back in for a further hearing whereby Hearings Examiner reduced earlier recommendations and plaintiff signed stipulation, agreeing to follow the reduced recommendations; plaintiff did not follow recommendations; red-flagged and Hearings Examiner determined that plaintiff had not followed the stipulation; appeal filed; "considering that plaintiff failed to fulfill the recommendations of Amethyst Foundation and then failed to fulfill the terms of the parties' February 11, 1993 stipulation, the decision appealed from was eminently reasonable and unquestionably lawful".
Curley v. Turner, 92-E-605, (Merrimack, Lynn, 12/29/92) REMANDED
Referred to further counseling by IDIP; plaintiff disagreed with recommended course of treatment and did not comply. Hearings Examiner ordered plaintiff to immediately start showing compliance and essentially follow recommendations of CADAC; Hearings Examiner reinstated plaintiff's driver license on a probationary basis; plaintiff did not follow recommendations in that he had not started AA until almost two months after he had been ordered to do so and had not obtained an AA sponsor; Hearings Examiner determined that plaintiff had failed to abide by probationary terms and suspended plaintiff's driver license; appeal filed; court remanded the case and stated "the hearings officer shall determine and make specific findings as to when petitioner began attending AA and if he continues to do so on a regular basis" and "… make finding as to exactly what efforts Petitioner took to obtain a sponsor and why such efforts were apparently not successful".
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II. Persons Hazardous to Public Safety/Saf-C 204.13 (formerly 203.12)
Black v. Bailey, 220-2012-CV-00126, (Tucker, 12/4/12), AFFIRMED
License suspension based on inability to pass written portion of driver exam. Unable to pass electronic exam. Hearings Examiner ordered retraining and permitted written exam. Petitioner's physician submitted a letter recommending an oral exam. Court dismissed petition but order included language recommending that the Director allow an oral exam due to her anxiety in taking other forms of the exam.
Howes v. Beecher, 10-0005, (Lynn, 3/19/10), AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART
License suspension based on improper driving. Officer responded to scene and spoke to victim of hit and run accident. Victim walking his dog on the right side of the road when struck from behind by vehicle. Vehicle described as reddish orange Nissan Sentra. Silver colored vehicle located at a residence in the same neighborhood, registered to Petitioner, with damage to the passenger's side mirror. Side mirror parts and plastic with silver paint found at accident scene. Petitioner spoke with police and claimed that he had hit a mailbox. Hearings Examiner found that Petitioner drove in an unsafe manner, caused a motor vehicle collision due to his reckless conduct, that he left the scene contrary to law, and that his driving misbehavior resulted in injury to a pedestrian. Court held that there was no evidence concerning the manner of operation being reckless. The letter from the officer that initiated the hearing did not allege speeding, lane violations, swerving or other indicators of reckless or improper driving. Evidence sufficient that Petitioner left the scene of the accident and that such was a hazard to public safety. Remanded for reconsideration on suspension length due to unsupported factual finding of recklessness. After remand hearing, suspension term amended from 12 months to 9 months.
deBoer v. Director, 09-0067, (Belknap, McGuire), 05/12/09, AFFIRMED
Improper Operation Appeal. Petitioner traveling at high speed. Petitioner and another vehicle driven by Petitioner's friend failed to negotiate a turn in the road and crashed. Two in the other vehicle died. Court held that Petitioner had not satisfied his burden of proof on appeal. Petitioner's poor attitude and arguments reinforced the Hearings Examiner's finding that he is a hazard to public safety.
Suarez v. Veecher, 07-E-0292, (Grafton, Vaughan, 05/16/08) AFFIRMED
Petitioner appealed the decision by the hearings examiner that he was not eligible for an additional driving test after failing a number of tests and having the Director suspend his license and operating privileges. Petitioner asked the Court to lift the suspension so he could practice driving from time to time with a certified driving instructor and become eligible for another opportunity to take the test. The Court ruled that the evidence presented at hearing was sufficient, and that the H.E. made no error of law.
KATZ v. DOS et al, 07-E-0491, (Rockingham, McHugh, 02/08/08) DISMISSED
Petitioner appealed the decision by the hearings examiner that she was not eligible for a waiver of the SR-22 requirement that resulted from her conviction for Conduct After Accident in District Court and again in Superior Court on appeal.  The attempted collateral attack was rejected by the Court and the petition was dismissed."
Meilleur v. Beecher, 07-E-0186, (Rockingham, Nadeau, 08-14-2007) REMANDED
Underage Petitioner was found to be hazardous and suspended for one year after hearing. Trooper's allegations included high speed, accident, and disobeying by turning off headlights. He alleged that rules were unconstitutional because they provided no guidelines for timed suspension. He alleged the timed suspension was too long because he had provided mitigating evidence and there was no justification for it in Hearings Examiner's report. The Court disagreed with the constitutional argument, but remanded for Hearings Examiner to clarify why the one year suspension was appropriate and to possibly reconsider.
Williams v. Beecher, 07-E-0049, (ND Hills, Abramson,03/16/07) AFFIRMED
Petitioner's privileges remained suspended after she requested a hearing to reopen her earlier hearing regarding Misuse/Abuse, Improper Operation and Medical reasons. Petitioner asserted that she had newly discovered evidence, but declined to provide it to the court. The Court dismissed the appeal. (See 06-E-0286 below)
Williams v. Beecher, 06-E-0286, (ND Hills, Abramson,07/21/06) AFFIRMED
Petitioner's privileges were suspended after hearing regarding Misuse/Abuse, Improper Operation and Medical reasons. Petitioner argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the H.E.'s conclusions and that his factual findings were largely untrue. The Court found ample evidence in the record to support the H.E.'s conclusion that the Petitioner drove improperly, that she has a documented history of serious driving misconduct and she suffers from a psychiatric condition, thus rendering her a hazard to public safety. The Court made specific note that the Petitioner admitted that she "…hears voices …" The Court ruled that the evidence presented at hearing was sufficient, and that the H.E. made no error of law.
Lamothe v.Beecher, 02-E-105 (ND Hillsborough, Lynn, 5/21/02) AFFIRMED
Plaintiff involved in a serious injury accident; Hearings Examiner determined that plaintiff operated his vehicle unlawfully when he "rear-ended" the other vehicle; court held that "the driver of a vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicles and the traffic upon and conditions of the way" citing Bridle v. Beecher and Rollins-Ercolino v. Beecher.
Adler v. Beecher, 02-E-02, (Rockingham, Hollman, 05/15/02) VACATED
Plaintiff involved in apparent "road rage" incident; driver license suspended; court held that Hearings Examiner's decision not supported by the evidence. (NOTE: Verbatim transcript prepared in this case; decision is fact specific and has no precedential value.)
Nichinello v. Beecher, 01-E-596, (Rock.., Hollman, 4/9/02,) VACATED
Plaintiff has several motor vehicle related incidents of misconduct and abuse of driving privileges indicating that he was a hazard to public safety; he attempted to procure information from Officer Newcomb before the hearing on the complaints against him and was denied; "nevertheless, notions of fundamental fairness require that an individual be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner; Hearings Examiner revoked his driver license for six months, all held in abeyance, conditioned on good behavior; the court finds that the Hearings Examiner's decision to suspend Petitioner's license was unreasonable. (NOTE: plaintiff made several claims of error during the hearing process, all of which are addressed to varying degrees by the Court in a detailed opinion.)
Wingate v. Beecher, 99-E-259, (Belknap, Perkins, 3/21/00) AFFIRMED
Plaintiff was involved in accident resulting in brain damage and partial paralysis; Hearings Examiner determined that plaintiff was a hazard to public safety and revoked his driver license pending favorable medical/neurological evaluation and successful completion of a driver education program through an appropriate rehabilitation facility; plaintiff requested limited license to allow him to participate in the Adaptive Driving Association Program in Vermont; court held that "… a total reading of Dr. Welch's report causes one to clearly realize that the plaintiff is a poor candidate for driving and, more importantly, would not be safe … The Court does not find that plaintiff's request to participate in the Adaptive Driving Association Program at this point is compelling".
Duclos v. Beecher, 99-E-271, (ND Hillsborough, Conboy, 1/6/00) AFFIRMED
Plaintiff had hearing to suspend registration because his vehicle was involved in hit-and-run accident and he refused to divulge driver; during hearing it became apparent that plaintiff had been operating the motor vehicle at time of accident; a review of his driver record revealed that plaintiff's driver license had been suspended for most of seven of the ten previous years because of alcohol-related issues; Hearings Examiner determined that plaintiff was hazard to public safety and revoked his driver license; plaintiff ordered to abstain from alcohol and attend outpatient alcohol abuse counseling; plaintiff claimed that Hearings Examiner could not suspend driver license because the hearing pertained to registration; court held that "The petitioner cannot complain that he was not on notice that his driver's license could be suspended when the change in focus of the hearing resulted from the petitioner's failure to cooperate in the pre-hearing investigation"; plaintiff also argued that the Hearings Examiner's findings were not supported by the evidence; court held that "Based upon the evidence presented to the hearings examiner, including Trooper Jacques' observations of the petitioner in an intoxicated condition shortly after the accident and the petitioner's own testimony, the court finds that the decision to suspend the petitioner's driver license was properly based on the evidence presented …"; finally, court held that Hearings Examiner could rely upon the plaintiff's driver record in helping to reach decision that "… the plaintiff continues to suffer from alcoholism, a condition that impedes his ability to safely operate a motor vehicle".
Brady v. Beecher, 98-E-413, (Rockingham, Murphy, 9/28/98) AFFIRMED
Plaintiff had hearing based upon report from a state trooper that he purposely struck the rear of another vehicle, then yelled obscenities and threatened harm to the driver of the other vehicle; plaintiff was also abusive towards state trooper and was taken into custody; it was determined that plaintiff had prior incident in which he attempted to run a vehicle off the road; Hearings Examiner determined that plaintiff was a hazard to public safety and revoked his driver license for one year and ordered a psychological examination as a precondition to restoration of driver license; court held that "… the Court's review of the record reveals that there was sufficient evidence for the hearings examiner to suspend and impose a pre-condition to the restoration of the plaintiff's license. The Court also finds that the plaintiff received adequate notice of what he was charged".
Sprague v. Beecher, 97-E-171, (Strafford, Coffey, 6/11/98) AFFIRMED
Plaintiff had hearing based upon report from law enforcement agency that she suffered seizures while driving a motor vehicle; Hearings Examiner determined that plaintiff was a hazard to public safety and revoked her driver license until she could obtain a favorable medical evaluation; court held that "the administrative license suspension was not offensive to the regulatory scheme. The petitioner suffers from an incurable, uncontrolled disorder that results in random and incapacitating seizures, several of which have occurred while she was driving. The petitioner's condition presents the sort of hazard or danger that regulation 204.13 was designed to protect the public against"; court concluded that "… the petitioner suffers from a serious and complex medical condition that can spontaneously and unexpectedly render her incapable of driving … The threat to public safety is significant. When the petitioner can demonstrate through competent medical evidence that she can safely operate a motor vehicle, the DMV will restore her driving privileges". (NOTE: plaintiff made several claims of error during the hearing process, all of which are addressed to varying degrees by the Court in an extremely detailed opinion!)
Williams v. Turner, 94-E-425, (Rockingham, Coffey, 12/2/94) AFFIRMED
Plaintiff had hearing based upon report from law enforcement agency that he had committed acts constituting a hazard to public safety and misabuse of driving privileges; Hearings Examiner determined that plaintiff was indeed a hazard to public safety and in addition, had an alcohol problem not under control, whereupon plaintiff's driver license was revoked until he obtained a favorable psychological and alcohol evaluation; court found that "… the portion of the examiner's decision referencing plaintiff's problems with alcohol was correctly decided; court also found that "… the hearing examiner's finding, based upon police testimony and a police record, that plaintiff's driving behavior constituted a hazard to the public safety renders correct her reference to RSA 263:56 as a basis for suspension. For the same reason, the examiner's application of RSA 263:59, which provides that the director of DMV may order suspension of a license where a person is driving improperly so as to endanger the public, was entirely correct"; court also determined that license could be suspended indefinitely; plaintiff also argued that there was not sufficient notice of the regulations to be used against him prior to the hearing; court rejected that argument. (NOTE: there are other procedural arguments raised in this very lengthy detailed written opinion worthy of becoming familiar with!)
Miles v. Turner, 94-E-25, (Carroll, Fitzgerald, 8/12/94) REVERSED
Plaintiff voluntarily enrolled in Amethyst Foundation, Inc.; subsequently acquitted of DWI (so RSA 263:65-a does not apply); referred to further counseling by Amethyst Foundation, Inc.; plaintiff did not follow recommendations; plaintiff ordered to appear for hearing pursuant to Saf-C 203.12; Hearings Examiner determined that plaintiff "has an alcohol substance abuse problem not presently under control"; appeal filed; court determined that application of rule to plaintiff was unreasonable as information regarding plaintiff's alcohol problem came from Amethyst and not a law enforcement agency, citing RSA 263:56 I(h). (NOTE: there was also a direct challenge to the validity of Saf-C 203.12 but Court did not address whether the rule itself modified or added to the statutory language although Court did indicate that it had jurisdiction to decide the issue if it chose!)
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III. Medical Impairment/Saf-C 205.08 (formerly 204.08)
MacDonald v. Bailey, 218-2011-CV-01096, (McHugh, 10/27/11), AFFIRMED
Appeal of medical suspension for psychological reasons based on unusual behavior during several driving incidents in her town. Petitioner claimed that her medical evaluation indicated she did not suffer from seizures and appeared healthy enough to drive should have been accepted by the Hearings Examiner. Petitioner believed that there was a conspiracy against her that caused other drivers to flash on and off their high beam headlights while driving behind her. Based on this belief, she photographed vehicles during these incidents. Police referred case to DMV after several such incidents. Hearings Examiner's decision reasonable based on record. Although Petitioner lived normally in all other respects, her conduct while driving was abnormal and dangerous. Psychological evaluation and review hearing warranted.
Williams v. DOS, 10-E-0076, (Groff, 5/14/10), AFFIRMED
Appeal of medical suspension hearing. Petitioner submitted medical evaluations which Hearings Examiner rejected as insufficient. Court held decision reasonable given that evaluations failed to comply with Saf-C 205.08 by not establishing she had been symptom free for 12 months, or that any treatment program did not render her a hazard to public safety because she refused treatment. Court found Petitioner suffered from mental illness and needed treatment despite her assertions to the contrary and that she posed threat to public safety without treatment.
Gallant v. Director, 09-E-0136, (McHugh, 06/11/09), AFFIRMED Medical license suspension review hearing.  Petitioner's license suspended for medical reasons after an accident on 01/12/08.  After the first hearing, Hearings Examiner imposed specific conditions for the necessary medical evaluation including that he present 6 consecutive months of acceptable ammonia test levels.  Petitioner unable to satisfy requirement at second hearing and appealed to the Superior Court.  Court held that while it was unreasonable to continue the suspension solely due to the ammonia test results, continuing suspension proper until Petitioner introduced a clear medical opinion that he is safe to drive a vehicle and does not pose a risk to other motorists if his license is restored.  Petitioner permitted to request another hearing after obtaining a satisfactory medical evaluation.
Williams v. Director, 09-E-0053, (Hillsborough North, Mangones, 03/17/09), AFFIRMED
Medical license suspension due to mental illness. Review hearing after the imposition of the original suspension. At first hearing, Petitioner ordered to submit a mental health evaluation. Petitioner argued no doctor ever alleged that she was unsafe to drive or recommend that her license be suspended. Medical evaluation presented at hearing failed to address whether Petitioner had been symptom free for 12 months and had not dealt with issues of reoccurrence of condition. Decision reasonable and lawful. Hearings Examiner properly attributed behavior at the hearing to her mental illness, which warranted continuing the suspension.
Young v. Dept. of Safety, 08-E-0428, (Nicolosi, Merrimack, 02/13/09), AFFIRMED
Medical hearing. Medical problem diabetes. Respondent suffered 4 accidents caused by diabetic reactions. Three occurred during 2008, one occurred in 2004. Respondent argued that Hearings Examiner did not give his doctor's letter the appropriate weight and that it should have been deemed sufficient to restore his license, that Hearings Examiner was not competent decision maker due to lack of medical expertise, and that Hearings Examiner's evaluation of the evidence was flawed. The Court held that the Petitioner did not sustain his burden of proof. There is no legal authority to support argument that fact finder must have special expertise or training to decide a medical case. It was respondent's burden to introduce expert medical testimony if necessary. Hearings Examiner's conclusion that Respondent's medical condition impaired his ability to safely operate a vehicle supported by the evidence. Doctor's letter constituted an insufficient medical evaluation as it failed to give a definitive opinion evaluating respondent's risk to the public.
BARRIEAU v. BEECHER, 07-E-0598, (Rockingham, Nadeau,( 02/13/08) AFFIRMED
The Petitioner asserted that the hearings examiner was not entitled to require explanations for previous medical hearings and suspensions. The Court found the record supported the Hearings Examiner's determination. The hearings examiner was entitled to credit and give weight to the evidence she believed deserved it. The Court ruled that the evidence was presented at hearing and the Hearings Examiner's decisions were neither unjust or unreasonable, nor an error of law.
Robb v. Beecher, 07-E-097 (Carroll, Fauver, 08/10/07)
Petitioner's license was suspended after his primary care physician reported that he apparently has an alcohol problem which is not under control. Petitioner provided the Hearings Examiner with a not so favorable letter from a different doctor who was only recently acquainted with Petitioner. The hearings examiner ordered that the suspension continues. He appealed and argued that suspension should be rescinded because the alcohol problem did not involve allegations of driving. The Court agreed with the hearings examiner and found that the order was consistent with the evidence and was not unreasonable …
Leeman v. Beecher, 04-E-057, (Strafford, Fauver, 04-02-04) AFFIRMED
Petitioner suspended for medical reasons,Hearings Examiner required a favorable medical evaluation for reinstatement; Petitioner submitted a note by his doctor stating "that he should be okay to drive". License suspended until he provides a more comprehensive evaluation. "Court agrees with the Division that a more comprehensive evaluation and report is necessary …"
Mason v. Beecher, 02-E-353, (ND Hillsborough, Mangones, 11/7/02) AFFIRMED
petitioner suspended for medical reasons; Hearings Examiner required a favorable medical evaluation for reinstatement; petitioner submitted a medical evaluation stating OK to drive provided 5 conditions are complied with;…the examiner concluded that it would be difficult for the factors to be monitored, and impossible for DMV to do so. Therefore, the petitioner …was denied. Court held:"On the record before the Court, the Court does not conclude that the final action of the director was unreasonable."
Harrison v. Beecher, 02-E-116, (Rockingham, Lewis, 6/12/02) AFFIRMED
Plaintiff is a diabetic having physical reactions, making him an unsafe driver; after hearing, license was suspended until he provided medical evidence that his diabetic condition was under control. On appeal, plaintiff wanted to provide such medical evidence to the court; Judge held: Under RSA 263:76, court could not consider new evidence, could only review the record as developed before the Hearings Examiner.
Wingate v. Flynn, 97-E-13, (Belknap, Perkins, 4/4/97) AFFIRMED
Plaintiff involved in motor vehicle accident and as a result suffered brain damage and partial paralysis; after having had his license suspended indefinitely for medical reasons, plaintiff's driver license was restored on condition that he drive only with a driving instructor; plaintiff involved in second motor vehicle accident without a driving instructor; Hearings Examiner determined that plaintiff was a hazard to public safety and ordered him to produce a favorable neurological report and successfully complete a driver education program through an appropriate rehabilitation facility, such as Crotched Mountain; court concluded that "there is ample support in the record for the actions of the Director. The Court finds that the actions and requirements established by the Director as prerequisites for relicensing are reasonable".
Kirste v. Turner, 93-E-549, (SD Hillsborough, Dalianis, 2/4/94) AFFIRMED
Plaintiff involved in motor vehicle accident; law enforcement officer advised that plaintiff was epileptic and had seizure; plaintiff had also been involved in earlier accident where epilepsy was noted as the cause; Hearings Examiner determined plaintiff was a hazard to public safety and ordered medical evidence to be submitted which indicates that plaintiff is no longer a hazard to public safety; medical evidence sent to Hearings Examiner which was not sufficient; appeal filed; court held that "it must be borne in mind that public safety is the paramount issue here" and found that the decision was reasonable.
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IV. CHINS/RSA 263:56-B/Saf-C 215.01 (formerly 214.01)
Pabst v. Beecher, 06-E-0366 (Merrimack, McHugh, 12/19/06)
Petitioner received two consecutive seven month suspension of his driver's license after hearing. The Petitioner appeared pro se. The Petitioner stated that loss of license is a hardship for him but that is not the criteria the Court must use in making its decision. Given the fact that the Petitioner has three illegal possession of alcohol charges on his record, and the fact that he could have received a four year suspension of license, the Court cannot conclude that it was unreasonable or illegal for the Director of Motor Vehicles to impose a fourteen month suspension period. Accordingly, the plaintiff's appeal is denied.
Valera v. Turner, 94-E-94, (ND Hillsborough, Lynn, 5/26/94) REMAND
Plaintiff had pled true to two juvenile petitions involving drugs; Hearings Examiner determined that plaintiff's driver license should be revoked for one year on each petition, to run consecutive with each other; only issue on appeal was whether the penalty imposed should run consecutive or concurrent; court determined that penalty should run concurrent "given the fact that the hearing's officer imposed the maximum period of revocation on the sale offense, and given also the fact that the defendant has virtually no other motor vehicle record, the court deems it clearly unreasonable to impose an additional one year revocation for the offense of possession of a controlled drug with intent to sell".
LeClair v. Beecher, 05-E-277, (Strafford, Mohl, 03/15/06) AFFIRMED
Petitioner had pled guilty and was convicted of possession of alcohol and his driver's license was revoked for one year after he failed to appear several times after his first appearance when he requested time to obtain an attorney. The three issues on appeal were whether a person's appearance can be waived, whether the Director had authority to suspend under RSA 263:56-b, II where there was no recommendation from the court, and whether the motion to reopen was correctly denied when the motion to reopen simply stated that Petitioner had returned to NH and wanted his hearing. The court reviewed the rules Saf-C 203.06 and 203.09 and ruled that personal appearance is required. The court also determined that the language of the statute gives the Director all the authority needed to do a suspension. Finally the court determined that the examiner's finding that the letter failed to state good cause was not an error.
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V. Point System Suspension
Cresta v. Beecher, 09-E-0096, (Vaughan, 07/07/09), AFFIRMED
Appeal of demerit points hearing. Contested the SR22 and disputed her underlying motor vehicle record. Court dismissed the appeal holding that the order was reasonable and appropriate. The SR22 is mandatory.
Baker v. Beecher, 03-E-240, (Merrimack, O'Neill, 08/25/03) AFFIRMED
Petitioner over 21, has 23 demerit points in 2001-2002; Hearings Examiner awarded six months suspension with two months held in abeyance, conditioned on good behavior for one year; ordered driver attitude course completion and an SR-22 filing for three years;Petitioner alleges point total determined by the examiner was not correct and that the examiner failed to meaningfully address the SR-22 requirement.Court held: "The SR-22 sanction is not discretionary and even if the point total were changed Petitioner's total would still exceed the allowable total … Petitioner did not sustain his burden of showing the examiner was unlawful or unreasonable."
Palazolla v. Beecher, 02-E-212, (Rockingham, Lewis, 10/3/02) AFFIRMED
Petitioner over 21, has 27 demerits points 1999-2001; first hearing awarded 1-year suspension with 6 months held in abeyance; order rescinded and de novo hearing held before different Hearings Examiner. At de novo hearing, awarded 1-yr suspension. Petitioner alleges out-of-state speeding conviction improper; and, unreasonable for second Hearings Examiner to award full year suspension based on same record as the first hearing. Court held: Saf-C 212.03(f)requires that out-of-state convictions be considered for point purposes. The sanctions imposed in both hearings were within the authority and discretion of the Hearings Examiner. Even though based upon the same driver record, the Court could not say either sanction was unreasonable.
Valko v. Beecher, 99-E-27, (Sullivan, Morrill, 7/21/99) AFFIRMED
Plaintiff's license suspended for a period of one year, because of an accumulation of points on driver record; plaintiff claimed that out-of-state convictions could not be used because already had served suspension in that state and also, had no notice from this state that out-of-state convictions could result in suspension; court held "… irrespective of the fact that petitioner's Connecticut license was suspended for his driving convictions in that state, New Hampshire can lawfully make these convictions part of petitioner's New Hampshire driving record and assess them when determining whether his license should be suspended"; court further held, with regard to notice, that "first, under petitioner's theory, an individual would be able to have their driving record in a particular state expunged simply by moving to a new state and obtaining a new license. Secondly, under petitioner's interpretation of notice, in order to make a conviction in another state part of his permanent driving record, each state when issuing a driving violation would have to send notice to every other state in the country in case that individual ever decided to move there … Notice regarding convictions in other states is given when an individual receives a conviction in that state and when he applies for a New Hampshire license".
Crabb v. Turner, 94-E-311, (Merrimack, Smukler, 1/9/95) AFFIRMED
Plaintiff had hearing in 1993 whereupon Hearings Examiner suspended plaintiff's license for a period of one year with six months held in abeyance, because of an accumulation of points on her driver record; plaintiff had further hearing in 1994 because more demerit points had accrued, whereupon Hearings Examiner imposed the earlier six month suspension held in abeyance; in addition, the Hearings Examiner further suspended plaintiff's driver license for a period of one year with nine months held in abeyance (said suspension to run consecutive to six month suspension); plaintiff argued that demerit points counted in 1992 were recounted in 1994, and should NOT have been counted twice; court concluded that "the additional offenses committed by the petitioner, however, create a different set of demerit points. The fact that some of the demerit points overlap does not preclude the respondent from suspending the petitioner's license so long as the demerit points are not identical".
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VI. Fraudulent Activities/Prohibitions/RSA 263:12/Saf-C 204.15 (formerly 203.14)
Keefe v. Beecher, 00-E-107, (ND Hillsborough, Conboy, 5/11/00) AFFIRMED
Plaintiff had hearing because he attempted to purchase alcohol with a fictitious driver license; plaintiff admitted the facts and Hearings Examiner advised plaintiff that suspension period would be lower if plaintiff would reveal person who manufactured driver license; plaintiff refused to cooperate and Hearings Examiner revoked plaintiff's driver license for one year, with option to reduce to six months if he agreed to divulge information; court held that "… Mr. Normandin was justified in considering the petitioner's continued refusal to identify the manufacturer of the license when imposing the suspension. In addition, there were other factors contained in Moser's police report such as the petitioner's flight from the restaurant, his attempt to evade Moser, his marijuana possession, and his conduct at the booking process, which supported Mr. Normandin's decision".
Rush v. Turner, 94-E-263, (Rockingham, Coffey, 7/29/94) AFFIRMED
Plaintiff had hearing to determine if he had loaned his driver license to another, to gain access to liquor establishments; information received from law enforcement agency; Hearings Examiner revoked plaintiff's driver license for one year, with the right to petition for reinstatement in six months; court determined that there was no de novo hearing (which plaintiff argued) and that no new evidence would be considered; plaintiff argued that police report was relied upon in lieu of live testimony; "the petitioner, Mr. Rush, was advised that if he wished to have the law enforcement officer present at the administrative hearing, he was to notify the Bureau of Hearings five days prior to the hearing or his right was deemed to have been waived. Petitioner chose not to avail himself of that opportunity"; decision was not unjust or unreasonable and no errors of law.
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VII. Reciprocity
Emerson v. Bailey, 12-CV-384, (O'Neill, 3/12/13), REVERSED
Reciprocity suspension due to report from Virginia of conviction for Reckless Driving. Under Virginia law, speed above 80 miles per hour reckless. Speed suspension rescinded but Hearings Examiner denied request to change driving record to speed instead of reckless. Appealed that decision. Court held that not removing conviction from driving record violated the Driver License Compact because conduct in NH would not have been reckless driving but speed. Compact required NH to give same effect to conduct had it occurred in NH.
Crawford v. Bailey, 218-2012-CV-00866, (Delker, 11/1/12), AFFIRMED
Hearings Examiner upheld the denial of license renewal based on out of state suspension. Suspension due to unpaid speeding ticket. Petitioner defaulted on ticket and driving privilege suspended due to his refusal to pay a $25 filing fee for hearing. Petitioner appealed seeking injunctive relief and damages against Director of Motor Vehicles for denial of renewal. Petitioner argued that suspension invalid because it was the result of an administrative, not judicial process. Court held that DMV had legal authority based on the applicable default statutes in NH and MA related to traffic tickets, therefore, denial of right to renew license was proper. Court held issue of constitutionality of filing fee for trial in MA not properly before the court as it was a collateral attack.
CONNORS v. BEECHER, 08-E-0091, (Hills So, Nicolosi, 07/18/08) AFFIRMED
Plaintiff convicted of DWI in North Carolina; the state of New Hampshire revoked him for a period of nine months under reciprocity; plaintiff argued that notification by NC was improper, the suspension ordered by NH was excessive and his license must be restored after ninety days regardless of the length of suspension by NC. Court disagreed with all the arguments and opined that the Compact and reciprocity requirements controlled. Hearings Examiner's decision was just and reasonable but the date the suspension began must be changed to date of conviction in NC.
Cox v. Beecher, 02-E-220, (SD Hillsborough, Galway, 8/27/02) AFFIRMED
Suspension based on four out-of-state speeding convictions; Petitioner does not challenge decision based on the four convictions, but challenges one of the convictions. Evidence challenging that conviction not presented at administrative hearing. Court held: no new evidence on appeal; petitioner to present new evidence to Hearings Examiner.
Reinhold v. Beecher, 97-E-34, (Grafton, Arnold, 7/28/97) AFFIRMED
Plaintiff convicted of DWI in the state of Montana; the state of New Hampshire revoked him for a period of three years under reciprocity; plaintiff argued that the Montana offense was not "similar" to the corresponding New Hampshire offense; court stated "the Montana and New Hampshire statutes, while not exactly the same, are reasonably similar. Both are meant to stop and punish drunk drivers. While Montana may apply its statute more broadly, that difference does not render the entire statute dissimilar", citing Brooks v. Turner, below.
Lemire v. Beecher, 95-E-106, (Merrimack, McGuire, 6/20/95) AFFIRMED
Plaintiff convicted of Possession of a Controlled Drug and license was revoked in state of Massachusetts; the state of New Hampshire revoked him for the same period, under reciprocity; court determined that notice provided was adequate and that Saf-C 203.01 was properly applied to his case. (NOTE: this case was appealed to the New Hampshire Supreme Court but was later withdrawn before any action occurred)
Dexter v. Turner, 94-E-21, (Rockingham, Gray, 3/24/94) AFFIRMED
Plaintiff involved in fatal accident in state of Massachusetts and license was revoked for 10 years; the state of New Hampshire revoked him for the same period, under reciprocity; "the administrative rules of the Department of Safety (Saf-C 203.01) are rather clear that the license in New Hampshire shall remain suspended while the suspension in another State remains in effect. It would thwart the very purpose of the Compact if the plaintiff were free to drive in this State while his right to operate remained suspended in another. While he may have been a juvenile when this tragedy occurred, that status has no application when it comes to the revocation or suspension of licenses or rights to operate".
Brooks v. Turner, 94-E-40, (Rockingham, Gray, 3/24/94) AFFIRMED
Plaintiff obtained conviction in state of Maine for Driving with an Excess Blood Alcohol Level and license was revoked for 90 days; the state of New Hampshire revoked him for the same period, under reciprocity; plaintiff argued that the Maine offense was not "similar" to the corresponding New Hampshire offense; court determined that the offenses were indeed "similar"; "the officer need not go into a legal analysis each time the two statutes are presented to him as to why they are similar. They remain similar until such time as there is a finding that they are no longer. The burden of proving dissimilarity is on the party claiming it. (Saf-C 203.06(I)(2)". (NOTE: See also Donnelly v. Turner, 94-E-64, (Rockingham, Gray, 3/21/94), which was joined with the above case and decided together; these cases were appealed to the Supreme Court, which declined to accept them)
Tourtellot v. Turner, 92-E-229, (Rockingham, O'Neil, W., 9/24/92) AFFIRMED
Plaintiff under revocation in state of Florida; state of New Hampshire revoked him under reciprocity; "inasmuch as New Hampshire must give full faith and credit to the laws of Florida under the Driver License Compact to which both New Hampshire and Florida are members, there is no legal basis to grant plaintiff the relief sought".
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VIII. Uninsured Accidents
Spooner v. Department of Safety, 09-E-0066, (Arnold, 9/16/09), AFFIRMED Uninsured accident. Petitioner failed to sustain burden of proof and decision upheld.
Brown v. Department of Safety, 09-E-0101, (Rockingham, Lewis), 05/20/09, AFFIRMED
Uninsured accident appeal. The Petitioner disputed the amount of the damages found, not liability. Hearings Examiner had proper evidence at the hearing of damages in the amount of $2603. Petitioner did not sustain his burden of proof to vacate the finding.
Tynan v. Beecher, 08-E-0072,(So Hills, Groff,03/12/08) AFFIRMED
Petitioner involved in an accident with no automobile insurance; Petitioner challenged findings, but raised no specific issues. Court affirmed in a two line per curiam opinion.
Cox v. Beecher, 06-E-0288, (Belknap, Smukler, 05/09/07) REVERSED
Suspension of license for an uninsured accident was upheld by HE. Hearings Examiner applied incorrect standard to review of whether Petitioner caused or contributed to accident. He applied reasonable possibility of judgment standard. Saf-C 208.09 (c) calls for a review of whether there exists doubt as to whether a judgment would be obtained.
Valcour v. DMV, 04-E-220 (SD Hillsborough, Hampsey, 06/30/04) AFFIRMED
Petitioner involved in an accident with no automobile insurance; Hearings Examiner concluded there was reasonable possibility of judgment and revoked Petitioner's diver license and assessed the security deposit. HELD: "… there is no basis for this Court to lower the security amount required for deposit with the DMV as determined at the prior hearing."
Marsh v. Beecher, 03-E-83 (Strafford, Mohl, 07/03/03) REVERSED
Petitioner involved in an accident while operating a commercial dump-truck; unaware that the Trucking Company did not have the appropriate insurance coverage. Court held: "Petitioner had a good faith belief that his employer had the appropriate insurance;Petitioner carried appropriate motor vehicle insurance on his personal vehicles … but because of the exclusion in the policy …, the policy did not afford him coverage for this accident".
Thompson v. Beecher, 02-E-112 (Belknp, Smukler, 7/24/02) AFFIRMED
Petitioner involved in accident with no automobile insurance;Hearings Examiner concluded there was reasonable possibility of judgment and revoked petitioner's driver license;Court held that the statute requires that a driver's license be suspended if there is a reasonable possibility of judgment.
Cramer v. Beecher, 02-E-63, (Grafton, Hicks, 6/5/02) VACATED
Petitioner involved in accident with no automobile insurance; Hearings Examiner found "… is more than 50% at fault… ";Court held:"There is no clear explanation why… did not see the appellant nor indeed why he did not apply his brakes or take any other evasive maneuver to avoid a collision. Similarly, it is questionable why the appellant did not see … ;Weighing the evidence, a finding that the appellant is "more than 50% at fault in regard to this accident is unreasonable."
McCarthy v. Beecher, 01-E-160, (Strafford, Nadeau, 11/20/01) REVERSED
Petitioner involved in an uninsured accident; Hearings Examiner concluded there was reasonable possibility of judgment and revoked petitioner's driver license, pending security requirement and filing of SR-22; petitioner claimed there was no reasonable possibility of judgment; court held that: "… in this particular case, specifically, the roads were ice-covered, the lines and road markings were not visible, it was sleeting at the time of the accident, the petitioner was traveling 30 MPH in a 55 MPH zone, and the roads had not yet been salted … decision of the Hearings Examiner is reversed and the petitioner's license is reinstated."
LaBerge v. Beecher, 00-E-36, (Coos, Smith, 9/12/00) AFFIRMED
Plaintiff involved in accident with no automobile insurance; Hearings Examiner concluded there was reasonable possibility of judgment and revoked plaintiff's driver license, pending security requirement and filing of SR-22; plaintiff entered agreement with insurance company to pay damages in installments and had his driver license restored; plaintiff defaulted on agreement; at hearing, plaintiff indicated that he signed agreement under duress and that claim was inflated; court held that there was reasonable possibility of judgment in that "… Mr. Sanschagrin's vehicle was lawfully parked at the time the petitioner backed into the vehicle and was found in violation of RSA 265:94 for improper backing"; court concluded that "…the petitioner may litigate his liability for damages pursuant to 264:6, III; deposit the $1,573.67 in escrow pursuant to Saf-C 208.09 and 208.10; or arrive at a private settlement with the claimant. However, the Court cannot address the insurance fraud and/or duress claims in this appeal…".
Gould v. Beecher, 00-E-292, (ND Hillsborough, Brennan, 8/25/00) AFFIRMED
Plaintiff involved in accident with no automobile insurance; Hearings Examiner concluded there was reasonable possibility of judgment and revoked plaintiff's driver license, pending security requirement and filing of SR-22; plaintiff claimed there was no reasonable possibility of judgment; court held that "… it does not appear that Virginia Gould 'ran' the stop sign, but that she may have slid through it due to the heavy snow. Also, there is a question as to the speed of the other driver, Jay Lewis… Of course, the Director's decision relates only to the financial responsibility law and does not require that Virginia Gould pay Jay Lewis anything. The ultimate decision as to whether Ms. Gould was at fault and caused damages to Jay Lewis's vehicle, as well as the amount of those damages, if any, would require legal proceedings outside the context of this case".
Emmanuel v. Beecher, 00-E-157, (Merrimack, McGuire, 8/11/00) AFFIRMED
Plaintiff involved in accident with no automobile insurance; Hearings Examiner concluded there was reasonable possibility of judgment and revoked plaintiff's driver license, pending security requirement and filing of SR-22; plaintiff claimed that the security requirement should not be applicable because Worker's Compensation covered the other party's medical expenses; court held that "…Workers' Compensation insurance is not a form of insurance or bond carried by an automobile driver or owner to cover personal or property damage in the event of an accident…Second, the statutory requirements of RSA 264:3, I do not depend on whether the petitioner ever has judgment entered against him as a result of his accident…The Court finds that there is a reasonable possibility of a judgment against the petitioner…".
Healy v. Beecher, 98-E-183, (ND Hillsborough, Sullivan, 8/13/98) AFFIRMED
Plaintiff involved in accident with no automobile insurance; Hearings Examiner concluded there was reasonable possibility of judgment and revoked plaintiff's driver license, pending security requirement and filing of SR-22; court held that "although the petitioner may have stopped at the stop sign and flashing red light governing his direction of travel, by his own testimony and the photographs of the accident scene in this case it is obvious he misjudged whether there was sufficient time and distance for him to cross the intersection safely without interfering of the travel of a pick up truck, operated by Ronald Lahey, east on New Boston Road".
Summer v. Beecher, 97-E-338, (ND Hillsborough, Sullivan, 10/24/97) REVERSED
Plaintiff owner of vehicle involved in accident with no automobile insurance; Hearings Examiner concluded there was reasonable possibility of judgment and revoked plaintiff owner's driver license, pending security requirement and filing of SR-22; court held that "an owner is not liable for the injuries caused by the operation of their vehicle by a third party absent special circumstances which were not alleged in this case … no evidence was submitted to the Hearings Officer that petitioner caused or contributed to the accident on April 13, 1996. Petitioner was simply the owner of the vehicle. Consequently, the court finds that RSA 264:6, I(b) applies and prohibits application of RSA 264:3".
Babushkin v. Beecher, 95-E-38, (Merrimack, Arnold, 3/20/95) AFFIRMED IN PART
Plaintiff involved in accident with no automobile insurance; Hearings Examiner concluded there was reasonable possibility of judgment and revoked plaintiff's driver license, pending security requirement and filing of SR-22; plaintiff challenged damage in amount of $1,707; "the Court finds that the amount of $1,070 as reflected in the small claims writ filed by Sheila Craigue is the most accurate evidence as to the damages incurred due to the plaintiff's negligence".
Sielian v. Turner, 94-E-358, (SD Hillsborough, Smukler, 3/16/95) REVERSED
Plaintiff involved in accident with no automobile insurance; Hearings Examiner concluded there was reasonable possibility of judgment and revoked plaintiff's driver license, pending security requirement and filing of SR-22; "After hearing, the Court finds that there is no reasonable possibility that the insured will recover a judgment against the petitioner in the amount of $1,439. Given the substantial evidence of comparative negligence on the part of the insured, the Court finds that there is no reasonable possibility that the insured will cover a judgment higher than $700".
Steele v. Turner, E-94-88, (Belknap, O'Neil, W., 7/28/94) REVERSED
Plaintiff involved in accident with no automobile insurance; Hearings Examiner concluded there was reasonable possibility of judgment and revoked plaintiff's driver license, pending security requirement and filing of SR-22; court "finds the evidence is inconclusive that Rodney Steele was legally at fault for the accident in question". See also Wall v. Turner, E-93-16, (Belknap, O'Neil, W., 2/26/93) (NOTE: Judge O'Neil was very troubled with this law and stated in both cases that he did not think it was his or anyone else's job to try and determine what jury in civil case might do, no matter how obvious, hence reversals in both cases!)
Lemire v. Turner, 93-E-477, (Merrimack, Smukler, 4/22/94) AFFIRMED
Plaintiff involved in accident with no automobile insurance; Hearings Examiner concluded there was reasonable possibility of judgment and revoked plaintiff's driver license, pending security requirement and filing of SR-22; court determined that the findings of the Hearings Examiner were appropriate; plaintiff also challenged the constitutionality of the Financial Responsibility Law. (NOTE: there is an extremely lengthy written opinion in this case dealing with the constitutionality of the law which is most definitely worth becoming familiar with!)
Lavalliere v. Turner, 93-E-517, (ND Hillsborough, Barry, 11/8/93) AFFIRMED
Plaintiff involved in accident with no automobile insurance; Hearings Examiner concluded there was reasonable possibility of judgment and revoked plaintiff's driver license, pending security requirement and filing of SR-22; "the Court finds that the plaintiff has failed to comply with the statutory mandate of the financial responsibility law and agrees with the Department of Motor Vehicles that there is a reasonable likelihood of judgment against the plaintiff in the event of legal action. The plaintiff's argument that the license loss is a hardship because he works on the road is a matter of his own doing".
Mendozza v. Turner, 93-E-416, (Rockingham, Coffey, 10/13/93) AFFIRMED
Plaintiff involved in accident with no automobile insurance; Hearings Examiner concluded there was reasonable possibility of judgment and revoked plaintiff's driver license, pending security requirement and filing of SR-22; Court found that the findings were appropriate and that there was a reasonable possibility of judgment against plaintiff. (NOTE: court put much weight on the fact that plaintiff had been convicted of a Solid Line violation pertaining to the accident!)
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IX. Fatal Crash
Campbell v. Bailey, 220-2012-CV-135, (Tucker, 1/9/13), REMANDED
Fatal crash where Petitioner struck and killed a pedestrian walking in the breakdown lane. In the report, Hearings Examiner used incorrect statutory language in that he said negligent operation of vehicle rather than unlawful or reckless operation caused the accident resulting in death, and was therefore, incorrect. Due to application of incorrect statutory legal standard, court remanded. Suspension order vacated but suspension remained in effect while case was pending.
Upson v. Bailey, 216-2011-CV-00949, (Colburn, 3/9/12), REVERSED
Fatal crash restoration. Hearings Examiner denied restoration because respondent had suspended sentence as a result of the criminal case from the accident as an unfulfilled court imposed sanction under Saf-C 209.06(a)(6). Court reversed because both criminal court and Hearings Examiner at suspension hearing contemplated a 3 year license suspension, and not additional suspension period during suspended jail sentence. Denying restoration would cause an unjust result although Hearings Examiner's interpretation of rule considered reasonable.
Cruz v. Bailey, 216-2011-CV-00927, (Garfunkel, 2/24/12), AFFIRMED
After remand, license restoration hearing held. Hearings Examiner denied reinstatement under Saf-C 210.03(a)(6) due to unsatisfied court imposed sanction of suspended jail sentence. Petitioner argued that under DWI restoration statute, RSA 265-A:22 which states probation or parole does not prohibit restoration, she was entitled to restoration. Court disagreed and upheld decision citing O'Hearn v. Beecher.
Cruz v. Bailey, 216-2011-CV-00107, (Garfunkel, 4/20/11), REMANDED
Motion to reopen same case granted and hearing held due to new evidence, lab report about hot shock evidence. Report stated no evidence of hot shock which contradicted officer's statement at scene. Hearings Examiner upheld prior order and determined that even considering lab report, such did not prove light not on because motorcycle did not receive sudden impact to cause hot shock. Court found that Hearings Examiner improperly shifted burden of proof to respondent by report which stated, "I cannot find that the lab reports persuade me that the head lamp on the motorcycle was not on." Remanded to Hearings Examiner to consider evidence without shifting burden of proof. After remand, Hearings Examiner reduced suspension term to 1 year because he changed his original finding that headlight was on at time of crash.
Cruz v. Beecher, 10-E-0117, (Mohl, 5/24/10), AFFIRMED
Personal injury crash involving Petitioner driving SUV and motorcycle. Respondent failed to yield while turning left and motorcycle crashed to avoid collision. Alleged that motorcycle headlight not illuminated at time of crash. Officer at scene stated he saw evidence of hot shock on motorcycle headlight which indicated it was illuminated. Lab test to determine whether there was evidence of hot shock incomplete. Also argued 2 year suspension excessive. Court found decision reasonable and lawful.

Gorsuch v. State, 09-E-0255, (Barry, 11/05/09), REMANDED-DEPARTMENT'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER DENIED
Fatal crash hearing. Issue was vehicle operator. Expert opinions offered by both sides. Petitioner alleged that he should be allowed to introduce additional expert testimony in Superior Court that supported his argument that the Petitioner was not driving. In initial order, court stated that order was unjust at that time. Case remanded for further expert testimony. Director filed motion to reconsider. Court denied. (Dismissed at remand hearing)

McAllister v. Beecher, 08-E-0444, (Nicolosi, 07/24/09), AFFIRMED
Fatal crash hearing. Petitioner alleged that he was not provided with an exculpatory police report before the hearing and that it should have been continued, that the Trooper presenting the case presented facts not contained in the record and to which she did not have personal knowledge of, that the hearing should have been continued until the Superior Court issued a decision on an ALS appeal for the same crash, and that the hearings examiner made findings of fact no supported by evidence in the record. Due to the civil nature of the hearing, the Petitioner was not entitled to exculpatory evidence and court held the exclusionary rule inapplicable to the case. Also, the police report was not necessary for a fair hearing under Saf-C 203.32. The Trooper properly presented the case even though she did not have personal knowledge because investigating officer not required to satisfy due process in the context of a license suspension hearing. Trooper did more than merely read reports into the record. Hearings Examiner did not err in denying continuance until ALS decision rendered because each hearing had different issues. Even if Petitioner prevailed in ALS appeal, such would not have influenced outcome of fatality hearing. Finally, all findings of fact based on testimony and evidence in the case record. Evidence need only show Petitioner materially contributed to accident, not that he was the sole or primary cause.
Burns v. Beecher, 08-E-0154, (Houran, 07/08/09), VACATED AND REMANDED
Fatal crash hearing. The respondent crossed the yellow line and struck another vehicle head-on while under the influence and with a BAC of .14. Argued on appeal that decision unreasonable for 3 reasons: evidence insufficient to support suspension, discovery violation due to state's failure to provide all information utilized in hearing to respondent prior to hearing and hearing untimely because it was brought 23 months after crash. Court vacated and remanded for further hearing because there was no support in record for factual finding that respondent initially stated that the other vehicle swerved into her lane. Hearings examiner made credibility determination based on statement. Remanded to determine if such would cause different finding on liability (cause or materially contribute to crash which resulted in death). As to discovery, the issue rendered moot by remand because respondent has been provided with entire record. Action commenced timely under civil statute of limitations. Criminal statute of limitations inapplicable to proceeding.
Kean v. Beecher, 08-E-0208, (Tucker, Strafford, 02/27/09), AFFIRMED
Fatal crash hearing. Petitioner driving dump truck with a trailer. He turned left and failed to yield to oncoming motorcycle. Crash resulted causing the death of motorcyclist. Hearings Examiner found operation unlawful due to a violation of RSA 265:29, failure to yield right of way and suspended Petitioner's license for 3 years. Argued on appeal that driving not unlawful due to accident investigator's finding that motorcyclist could have avoided crash by using front brake to stop. Also challenged length of suspension. Court held that even assuming that the motorcyclist did not use the front brake to avoid crash, such did not negate Petitioner's unlawful driving, and therefore, decision not unreasonable or unlawful. Length of suspension proper and fair.
Groleau v. Beecher, 08-E-0222, (Smukler, Belknap, 01/14/09), AFFIRMED
Fatal crash hearing. Trooper in crossover on I-93, vehicle passed his location and made unsafe lane change, forcing vehicle in right lane off of road. Driver died. Petitioner argued that there was insufficient evidence that she executed an illegal lane change. Also, that the hearings examiner erred by using prior convictions for speed and driving while intoxicated for assessing fault. The court held that the Hearings Examiner had sufficient credible evidence that the Petitioner committed an unsafe lane change. The Hearings Examiner properly considered the Petitioner's driving record in reaching a decision since such was relevant to whether she was speeding at the time of passing the police cruiser, which would have caused her to make a sudden and abrupt lane change.
Ridley v. Beecher, 07-E-0151 (Coos, Houran, 06/04/08) AFFIRMED
Petitioner's license was suspended for seven years (with leave to get it back in five) after hearing on crash resulting in a fatality. Petitioner lost control while rounding a right turn too quickly and striking an embankment. Her passenger was killed. Petitioner argued that the seven year suspension was unjust and unreasonable analogizing to points system suspensions and other decisions which predated the seven year allowable suspension law change. Hearings Examiner considered the recklessness of her driving, her age, the brief time she held her license, her remorse and next of kin and parents statements. Court concluded that Petitioner did not meet her burden of showing that the Hearings Examiner's decision was unjust and unreasonable as to length of suspension.
Davis v. Beecher, 07-E-0475 (So. Hills, Groff, 02/25/08) AFFIRMED
Petitioner's license was suspended for two years after hearing on crash resulting in personal injury. Crash with motorcycle resulted from Petitioner speeding and going through a stop sign. Petitioner argued that the evidence was not sufficient for the purpose of deciding whether Petitioner's operation was reckless or unlawful. The Court concluded that Petitioner did not meet his burden of showing that the Hearings Examiner's decision that he was negligent and unlawful for running stop sign was unjust or unreasonable.
Hureau v. Beecher, 07-E-0345 (Rockingham, Brown, 12/11/07) REVERSED
Petitioner's license was suspended for seven years after fatal crash but before hearing. Petitioner also convicted of negligent homicide in District Court and had license suspended by District Court for seven years consecutive to whatever DMV ordered. Petitioner requested a hearing about seven years later and both a fatal hearing and a fatal restoration hearing were scheduled and held in turn. The hearings examiner ordered no additional suspension. Petitioner could be restored immediately after hearing and completion of administrative restoration requirements, but for the District Court order. Petitioner argued that the DMV's order was unreasonable. The Court concluded that Petitioner met his burden of showing that the order was unjust and unreasonable.
Scimemi v. Beecher, 06-E-0042 (Sullivan, Houran, 12/04/06) AFFIRMED
Petitioner's license was suspended for six years after hearing. Petitioner argued that the Division improperly considered next of kin impact statements for the purpose of deciding whether Petitioner's operation was reckless or unlawful. The Court concludes that Petitioner did not meet his burden of showing that the Hearings Examiner's improperly considered next of kin statements such that the decision is illegal or is unjust or unreasonable. Petitioner gave statements that "he did not see the vehicle he must have lost it in the sun but felt it was his fault as he crossed into the lane of on-coming traffic and did not signal." Petitioner next asserts that the Division's findings that his operation was reckless or unlawful was not supported by the evidence, rendering the Division's decision unreasonable. Upon examination of the record, the court disagreed.
Murphy v. Beecher, 06-E-0165, (Rockingham, Smukler, 08/01/06) AFFIRMED
Petitioner involved in a fatal crash. The H.E. determined that the Petitioner did drive in an unlawful manner in violation of RSA 265:22 and RSA 265:79-b, thereby materially contributed to the death of another, and suspended his license for five years. Petitioner argued on appeal that the five-year suspension was unreasonable; insisting that only a two-year suspension is warranted. The State asserted that the Petitioner's age and (in)experience, as well as the circumstances of the accident, support the five-year suspension. The Court wrote, specifically, that it's function is "…not to substitute its judgement…" for that of the Hearings Examiner, but limited to determining "…whether the record supports the respondent's discretionary determination …" Based upon that, the Court found that the Petitioner had failed to sustain his burden and AFFIRMED the Hearings Examiner.'s decision of a five-year suspension
O'Hearn v. Beecher, 04-E-141, (Grafton, Burling, 07/09/04) AFFIRMED
Petitioner involved in a fatal accident; Petitioner claimed the Hearings Examiner erred as a matter of law by finding that a suspended sentence is a court-imposed sanction. HELD: "The Court agrees with the State's assertion that to suggest that a suspended sentence is not a sanction is not supportable." "The court rules that a suspended sentence is a criminal sanction and remains a criminal sanction until the period expires in which the suspended sentence may be imposed."
Doherty v. Dir., DMV, 04-E-129 (Rockingham, Perkins, 07/08/04) AFFIRMED
Petitioner involved in a serious property damage accident; Petitioner appeared without counsel; claims violation of his due process rights with regard to the unconstitutionality of the Statute or the failure of the State to prove serious injury. HELD: "…the State did not need to do so". Petitioner requested a continuance, GRANTED. At the hearing Petitioner requested another continuance, DENIED.Court held: Petitioner having been previously advised of the right to have counsel chose not to appear at the hearing with counsel. "Under these circumstances, the Hearings Examiner's refusal to grant a further continuance was reasonable. The court finds that the Order of the Hearings Examiner is reasonable and just and affirms that order."
Flanders v. NH Dept. of Safety, 04-E-42, (Grafton, Houran, 05/12/04) AFFIRMED
Petitioner involved in fatal accident;Hearings Examiner determined that Petitioner drove in an unlawful manner in violation of RSA 265:60, I and thereby materially contributed to an accident resulting in the death of another in violation of RSA 263:56 I (g) and revoked his driver license for 3 months. HELD: "Petitioner was driving faster than reasonable and prudent under the conditions, … and thereby materially contributed to the accident resulting in … death."
Ercolino v. Beecher, 02-E-307, (Rockingham, Coffey, 2/11/03) AFFIRMED
Petitioner involved in fatal accident; suspended for 3 years with right to request early restoration after 1 year based primarily on professional evaluation that Petitioner had been sober for 8 years;and predicated upon the presumption that the RSA 265:93 blood test result would be consistent. Subsequently, the test result indicated the presence of marijuana. Early restoration hearing held before a different Hearings Examiner. All conditions for restoration in Saf-C 209.06 were met; however, was denied restoration based on blood test results. Petitioner now alleged it was error to consider the blood test results. Court held: Petitioner has not presented law or logic to establish that the … acted unlawfully or unreasonably by allowing the State to introduce evidence resulting from Petitioner's mandatory blood test at the early restoration hearing. This evidence, … establishes that Petitioner failed to meet a condition on which her right to early restoration was based.
Clark v. Beecher, 02-E-383, (ND Hillsborough, Mangones, 10/21/02) AFFIRMED
Petitioner involved in fatal accident;Hearings Examiner determined the petitioner's unlawful operation materially contributed to an accident resulting in the death of another and revoked his driver license for a period of two years; petitioner alleged the Hearings Officer entered certain findings of fact which are unsupported by the record. Court concluded that a trier of fact could find, not unreasonably, that if petitioner's speed had been less, he would have observed … laying on the road, and, if reasonable observations had been made, he could have taken appropriate steps to avoid the collision. The statute requires a driver be aware of "actual and potential hazards then existing." RSA 265:60 and requires that "in every event speed shall be so controlled as may be necessary to avoid colliding with any person … on or entering the way in compliance with legal requirements and the duty of all persons to use due care."
Mulligan v. Beecher, 02-E-8, (Merrimack, Perkins, 7/12/02) AFFIRMED
Petitioner involved in a fatal accident; convicted of vehicular assault in violation of RSA 265:79-a on a negotiated plea which included a one-year driver license revocation. As a result of fatal accident hearing, petitioner's driver license suspended for 2-years. On appeal, petitioner argued it was unreasonable and unlawful not to make the period of suspension the same as the Court's. HELD: RSA 263:56,IV which provides, in relevant part, that a Director shall not take into consideration or give any weight to the lack of a criminal prosecution in making a decision concerning license suspension or revocation. The State argues that it would therefore logically follow that the Hearings Examiner may not give weight to the result of any such criminal prosecution. The Court agrees with the State that the administrative hearing is intended to be separate and distinct from any criminal prosecution or lack thereof.
Rivard v. Beecher, 01-E-547, (ND Hillsborough, Conboy, 4/24/02) AFFIRMED
Plaintiff involved in a fatal accident; Hearings Examiner revokes his driver license for a period of seven years; plaintiff argued that the seven year suspension is unjust and unreasonable; plaintiff submitted a compilation of the sanctions imposed in 39 other ALS reports involving fatalities; court finds that like sentencing judges, hearings examiners must determine the appropriateness of any particular disposition or sanction based on the unique facts of each case.
Center v. Beecher, 01-E-276, (Belknap, Smukler, 4/1/02) REMANDED
Fatal accident hearing; Hearings Examiner suspended petitioner's driver license until medical proof that petitioner is medically fit to drive. Court held: affirmed the driver license suspension, but remanded for new sanction to be imposed. Reasoning: RSA 263:56 II authorizes suspension for up to 7 years. There was no evidence of physical impairment; and, suspension could end up being indefinite. Remanded for a new sanction within the scope of RSA 263:56 III.
Foudriat v. Beecher, 01-E-241, (Belknap, Perkins, 2/4/02) VACATED
Appeal hearing under RSA 263:76; petitioner requests to submit new and additional evidence in Superior Court, citing Allard v. Power, 122 NH 27 (1982) Held: "The petitioner's reliance on Allard is misplaced. In Allard, the supreme court compared the statute in effect at the time (RSA 262:41) with other administrative appeals provided for by the legislature. Id … While the Allard matter was pending, RSA 262:41 was replaced by RSA 263:76 (1981) Nor did the new statute provide for a presumption of reasonableness. However, RSA 265:76 was generally amended in 1985. It was in this amendment that the legislature chose to add presumption of reasonableness language to RSA 263:76 (quote below) that has remained unchanged to date. By providing this language, the legislature has clearly established that the scope of review in appeals based on RSA 263:76 is to be limited to a review of the record.
Hand v. Beecher, 01-E-012, (Coos, O'Neill, 12/20/01) AFFIRMED
Plaintiff involved in a fatal accident; Hearings Examiner determined that petitioner's unlawful operation caused accident which materially contributed to the death of another and revoked his driver license; court finds that the hearings examiner had evidence before him that 1) the petitioner maneuvered his vehicle in an unlawful manner which interfered with the safe flow of traffic contrary to RSA 265:94 and 2) Mrs. Vaughan's vision impairment did not change the findings of fact and conclusion of law that the petitioner operated his vehicle in a manner contrary to RSA 265:94.
Rollins-Ercolin v. Beecher, 01-E-382, (Rockingham, Hollman, 11/26/01) AFFIRMED
Petitioner alleged that RSA 263:56 I (g) is unconstitutional because it fails to set forth meaningful guidance as to what a driver must defend against; and, no objective factors for the Hearings Examiner to utilize in making his decision. Court held: the statute contains specific standards for the Hearings Examiner to follow; and, is sufficient to inform a driver what he is to defend against. "The statutes standards are clear and unambiguous", and are "self executing". (See full opinion for specific and exhaustive discussion.)
Cardillo v. Beecher, 01-E-164, (SD Hillsborough, GROFF, 11/01/01) AFFIRMED
Petitioner,the next of kin,wanted the alleged driver's license suspended;the hearings examiner could not determine by a preponderance of the evidence that the alleged driver was operating the motor vehicle at the time of the accident.(NOTE: This is the first appeal by next of kin under RSA 263:56 IV since the inception of the provision.)
Bridle v.Beecher, 01-E-359, (Rockingham, Hollman, 11/01/01) AFFIRMED
Plaintiff involved in fatal accident; plaintiff claimed a medical condition causing him to lose consciousness while driving; argues RSA 263:56 I (g) has a mens rea requirement.Court held this statute does not require the examiner to find a mens rea when suspending a license; "recklessness" involves a mens rea, "unlawfulness" does not necessarily involve one … "the statute provides the Examiner with an option on which to base a license suspension; either a reckless act or an unlawful act." Court held:"The Examiner's decision to suspend … was reasonable and consistent with the purpose of RSA 263:56 I (g), to ensure highway safety. NOTE: "… the DOS informed petitioner … as soon as he presents a physician's statement … he will be eligible for reinstatement of his license … This commitment by the DOS is consistent with the purpose of the statute which is to assure the safety of people using our highways."
Estabrook v. Beecher, 01-E-310, (Merrimack, Arnold, 10/3/01) AFFIRMED
Involved in a fatal accident; five-year suspension; petitioner claims length of suspension is excessive; RSA 263:56,I(g), … "authorizes the Motor Vehicle Director to revoke or suspend any license for up to seven years"; Court finds that the Hearing Officer's suspension of the Petitioner's license for five years was not an abuse of the Hearing Officer's discretion or was unreasonable or unlawful."
Davis v. Beecher, 01-E-270, (Rockingham, Lewis, 9/24/01) AFFIRMED
Plaintiff involved in fatal accident; Hearings Examiner determined "Petitioner drove in an unlawful manner in violation of RSA 265:60 I, thereby materially contributing to an accident resulting in the death of Ms. Miller in violation of RSA 263:56 I (g); one-year suspension imposed. Court held "that "inattention/distraction" a responsibility that Petitioner bears, is not excused by the "tickling" done by Ms. Miller in the circumstances presented. Petitioner maintained his vehicle at an excessive speed so as not to be able to avoid the deadly collision."
Beams v. Beecher, 99-E-142, (Strafford, Nadeau, 10/18/99) AFFIRMED
Plaintiff involved in fatal accident; Hearings Examiner determined that plaintiff materially contributed to the Death of another and revoked his driver license; plaintiff claimed there was no mental intent as he suffered from seizure disorder, which caused the accident; court stated that "… no exception exists in the statute for unlawful operation that results from a licensee's physical impairment. Had the legislature wanted to create such an exemption, it could have done so easily. It did not"; plaintiff also argued that delay in bringing action for two years violated due process; court stated that "First, the statute contains no limitation on the time in which the State may seek to revoke or suspend an individual's license. Second, in order to establish a due process violation, the petitioner must establish that the delay caused him prejudice … Since the court can find no prejudice, it cannot find the delay unreasonable"; finally, plaintiff argued that the statute was improperly applied to him as he was no longer a danger to public safety because his seizure disorder was under control; "That the application of the statute may result in a consequence the petitioner considers to be punitive does not render the examiner's finding erroneous. The evidence presented demonstrates that the petitioner is a safety hazard". (NOTE: very well-reasoned and detailed opinion)
Adams v. Beecher, 99-E-389, (Rockingham, Coffey, 10/5/99) REMANDED
Plaintiff involved in fatal accident; Hearings Examiner determined that plaintiff was only entitled to information which the trooper had in his file prior to the hearing, not information in possession of any other law enforcement personnel or the State Police; court stated that "In order to meaningfully defend himself at a hearing, the Respondent must have access to the same materials available to the State. This applies in Superior Court and ought to apply, as well, at administrative hearings. It is only through full and complete discovery that a search for justice can arrive at the truth of the matter. To deny the Respondent access to any information and materials, which are in the possession of the State, but are simply not going to be used by the State at a particular hearing, is to frustrate the goals of due process. A hearing held under these circumstances is rendered meaningless".
Rzasa v. Beecher, 98-E-112, (Rockingham, Galway, 6/16/98) AFFIRMED
Plaintiff involved in fatal accident; Hearings Examiner determined that plaintiff materially contributed to the death of another and revoked his driver license for a period of two years; plaintiff alleged 10 grounds for appeal, arguing that numerous administrative errors were made during the administrative hearing which prejudiced him; court addressed all the grounds and upheld the suspension. (NOTE: this is a very detailed opinion addressing all the grounds set forth in the appeal; including unsworn testimony of victim, numerous factual arguments and the fact that plaintiff was acquitted of all criminal charges)
Nadeau v. Beecher, 96-E-310, (Merrimack, McGuire, 1/6/97) AFFIRMED
Plaintiff involved in fatal accident; Hearings Examiner determined that plaintiff materially contributed to the death of another and revoked her driver license; court stated that "even if petitioner had demonstrated that Nicholas Armstrong's life would have been saved by use of a seat belt, that would not negate the fact that petitioner's unlawful operation caused the accident which resulted in his death".
Stanton v. Turner, 93-E-85, (ND Hillsborough, Barry, 5/17/93) REVERSED
Plaintiff involved in fatal accident; Hearings Examiner determined that plaintiff materially contributed to the death of another and revoked his driver license for two years; plaintiff had been ill prior to the accident but claimed he was feeling better; court held that "the evidence does not demonstrate that he was so ill, was so likely to become ill, or that plaintiff knew that he was so ill or so likely to become ill so as to make operation unsafe", therefore vacating findings of Hearings Examiner.
Gutteridge v. Turner, 91-E-83, (Cheshire, Sullivan, 2/11/93) AFFIRMED
Plaintiff involved in fatal accident; Hearings Examiner determined that plaintiff materially contributed to the death of another and revoked his driver license for three years; plaintiff had taken his eyes off the road in bad weather and crossed over the yellow line; plaintiff denied this; court concluded "the evidence supports the hearing officer's determination that the accident probably occurred when the petitioner took his eyes off the road to read directions during a heavy rain in an area where the road curved to the left, causing the petitioner's vehicle to cross over the center line and strike the decedent's car in the southbound lane". (NOTE: there is a very detailed factual written opinion in this case!)
DeSouza v. Turner, 92-E-25, (Grafton, Fauver, 11/25/92) AFFIRMED
Plaintiff involved in pedestrian fatality; Hearings Examiner determined that plaintiff materially contributed to the death of another and revoked his driver license for 18 months; court held "the findings of fact of the hearings examiner included the finding that the vehicle driven by the petitioner was not operating at a safe speed for the conditions existing and did not slow or stop while there was a pedestrian within the travel portion of the roadway. As a result, the pedestrian was struck by the automobile driven by the petitioner and subsequently died as a result of injuries suffered. The hearings examiner clearly finds unlawful conduct by the petitioner sufficient to result in a revocation of his license by RSA 263:56 I(g)".
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X. False Statement
Richer v. Bailey, 216-2013-CV-00016, (Garfunkel, Hillsborough, N., 2/5/13), REVERSED
Court held that denial of pending ticket was not material to the outcome of an original license suspension hearing because it was beyond the scope of the hearing under the administrative rule. Nothing in the factors permitted questioning on pre-conviction ticket. NOTE: Court granted Director's motion to reconsider and vacated decision holding case moot because Petitioner had served suspension.
Irish v. Beecher, 08-E-0558, (McHugh, Rockingham, 02/25/09), AFFIRMED
False statement hearing. Petitioner certified as an habitual offender. Two weeks after certification, arrested for driving and charged in district court with misdemeanor offense due to driving while habitual. Before court date on driving while habitual case, appeared at decertification hearing. At habitual offender decertification hearing, Hearings Examiner asked Petitioner, "Have you been charged with any motor vehicle offenses since the time of the certification hearing…" Petitioner answered no and was decertified. Thereafter, false statement hearing initiated and Petitioner's license suspended for 1 year. Petitioner appealed and gave several explanations for his conduct. He claimed that he has difficulty processing information and becomes easily confused, that the police had been out to get him, and that he was driving after suspension to get baby formula. Court held that question asked at decertification hearing was clear and easily understood. Petitioner made conscious decision to deceive Hearings Examiner in order to gain decertification to which he was not entitled. Therefore, Petitioner made a material false statement and license suspension warranted.
Peterson v. Beecher, 05-E-303, (ND Hillsborough, Mangones, 11/14/05) AFFIRMED
Petitioner's license was suspended after a hearing because he had presented a fictitious, simulated driver's license and the Liquor Commission Investigator requested a hearing. Petitioner argued that Hearings Examiner was wrong because he had actually presented a Delaware falsified non-driver or resident identification card. Court reviewed the definition of " simulated " , Saf-C 204.15, the evidence and found that the ID card presented had many more characteristics of a license than an ID card and had the appearance of a license. Director's decision was therefore proper, just and reasonable.
Pierano v. Beecher, 05-E-294 (Rockingham, McHugh, 06/23/05) APPEAL DISMISSED
Plaintiff's driver license revoked after he defaulted a false statement hearing in 2003 which he alleged he falsified his residency for a license.  Hearing was reopened on his motion in 2005 and dismissed after he explained.  Even though he prevailed, he filed an appeal. The Court dismissed the appeal after he twice did not attend the oral argument for his appeal.  The Court also found that the Director was justified in proceeding with the investigation and 2003 hearing based on the evidence.
Carmen v. Beecher, 99-E-550 (Rockingham, Abramson, 11/22/99) AFFIRMED
Plaintiff's driver license revoked for DWI; needed to successfully complete an alcohol program prior to restoration; plaintiff assumed identity of deceased individual for almost seven years and received a New Hampshire driver license under the assumed name; license revoked for 12 months with four months held in abeyance for making false statement; "The petitioner seemed to argue that he is also entitled to credit from the time he voluntarily relinquished his license in February, 1999 until the time his license was suspended in March, 1999. This argument is specious. The petitioner is not entitled to 'credit' for time which he was not entitled to in the first place. He 'relinquished' a bogus license, not a valid one".
Jonis v. Beecher, 97-E-523, (Rockingham, Barry, 2/5/98) AFFIRMED
Plaintiff determined to be under revocation in the state of Massachusetts at the time he applied for and received a duplicate New Hampshire driver license; plaintiff claimed that he did not read the back of the application form and had no intent to deceive; court stated that there was sufficient evidence to find that plaintiff had made a false statement although portions of the application were not filled out especially since plaintiff checked off that he had "lost" license and that he was not under revocation in any jurisdiction.
French v. Beecher, 96-E-312, (Merrimack, Arnold, 12/16/96) AFFIRMED
Plaintiff determined to be under revocation in the state of Massachusetts at the time he applied for and received a duplicate New Hampshire driver license; court stated that there was sufficient evidence to find that plaintiff had made a false statement although portions of the application were not filled out; "the Court further finds that petitioner's submission of an incomplete application constitutes a material misrepresentation by virtue of the omissions".
Casey v. Beecher, 95-E-245, (Rockingham, Gray, 8/22/95) AFFIRMED
Plaintiff determined to be under revocation in the state of Massachusetts at the time he applied for and received a New Hampshire driver license; "the Hearings Examiner conceded that there is no specific documentary evidence that the petitioner received notice of the suspension. However, after considering the evidence presented, the Hearings Examiner concluded that the petitioner knowingly made a false statement"; Hearings Examiner's determination that petitioner's testimony was "not credible" was proper.
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XI. Under Twenty Hearings
Page v. Beecher, 07-E-221, (Merrimack., Conboy, 06/12/07) AFFIRMED
Petitioner's license was suspended for 90 days under the under 20 law. Petitioner complained that the suspension should have been postponed to September because she would be in school and would not need her license. She had three previous suspensions based on the under twenty law, but had no new violations since June 2006. Court found that the balance weighed in favor of suspension and hearings examiner's discretion was properly exercised. Decision was neither unreasonable nor unlawful.
Telo v. Beecher, 05-E-169, (Straff., Mohl, 09/02/05) AFFIRMED
Petitioner's license was suspended under the under 20 law, but the suspension was all held in abeyance and on probation for a year conditioned on good behavior. Petitioner argued that decision was too harsh. He wanted to rehash the compelling circumstances from the hearing. Court declined to do so and appeal was dismissed as moot
Lewis v. Beecher,  05-E-171, (Straff., Fauver, 08/26/05) REVERSED
Petitioner's license was suspended after a hearing under the under 20 law and rule for 90 days.  Petitioner argued that Hearings Examiner did not consider compelling circumstances.   Notice of hearing advised Petitioner that rule was under Saf-C 204.031, but hearing was governed by Saf-C 204.04.  There was a substantive difference and Petitioner did not have adequate notice and opportunity to prepare a defense.  Director's decision was therefore unjust and unreasonable.
 
XII. School Bus Certificate
Walton v. Beecher, (Smukler, Belknap, 01/14/09) AFFIRMED
Suspension of school bus driver's license (certificate). Student exited Respondent's bus and walked behind the bus instead of the front. The bus driver's manual makes it the driver's responsibility to ensure that students walk in front of the bus and not behind it. Before incident, Respondent had been counseled by her superiors not to allow students to walk behind the bus. On day in question, Respondent's student exited the bus and walked behind the bus. Student hit by another vehicle. Suspension of school bus license based on her involvement in an accident that has a direct bearing on her fitness to drive. Respondent argued that she had not been involved in an accident. Court held that she had been involved in the accident because she was connected to it in a natural and logical way. As a bus driver, she had a duty to ensure that her passengers crossed in front of the bus. Her failure to do so caused a student in her bus to be hit. Consequently, she was involved in an accident within the meaning of the administrative rule, Saf-C 1304.04(8)
 
XIII. Fee Waiver
Raymond v. Department of Safety, 09-E-0151, (Bornstein, 09/29/09), REVERSED
Sex offender fee waiver hearing. Petitioner claimed indigent based on monthly income of $713 with monthly rent of $725. Petitioner's daughter purchased a vehicle, and paid to register and insure the vehicle. The Hearings Examiner denied the fee waiver due to the Petitioner's ability to have a vehicle. Court reversed and held that he had established indigency and sustained his burden to demonstrate that the decision was unreasonable. Petitioner's expenses exceed his income and the voluntary contributions were irrelevant to indigency
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XIV. Boating
Blizzard v. Bailey, 211-2010-CV-00215, (O'Neill, 2/7/11), DISMISSED
Review of administrative hearing that suspended right to operate a boat and safe boater's certificate which is required to operate a motor boat as a result of fatal crash. Appeal filed pursuant to RSA 263:76 in Petitioner's county of residence. Court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Petition of Mooney N.H. Supreme Court case indicating there is no right to Superior Court appeal since hearing did not involve the suspension of a driver's license. Appeal should be filed in N.H. Supreme Court under administrative procedure act.
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XV. Vehicle Registration
Blackden v. Bailey, 217-2011-CV-00229, (McNamara, 6/20/11), DISMISSED
Appeal of registration suspension due to misuse of vehicle by having emergency lighting and equipment and appearing at accident scene to take photographs as member of press. At time of appeal, vehicle had been transferred to LLC and registration no longer in existence. Dismissed as moot.
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