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| City
of Nashua Fire and Rescue Department
Complainant v. |
Case
No. F-0105-22 Decision No. 1998-032 |
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APPEARANCES Representing City of Nashua Fire and Rescue Department: Representing Int'l Assoc . of Fire Fiahters: Also appearing: BACKGROUND The City of Nashua, Fire and Rescue Department (City) filed
unfair labor practice (ULP) charges against the International Association of
Fire Fighters, Local 789 (Union) on November 5, 1997 alleging a violation of RSA
273-A:5 II (f) as the result of the Union's attempting to enforce an arbitration
award which was allegedly FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The City of Nashua, Fire and Rescue Department employs
firefighters and other personnel and, thus, 2. The International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 789, is the duly certified bargaining agent for fire fighting personnel employed by the City up to and including at least the rank of Captain. (There is a dispute in the pleadings as to whether Deputy Chiefs are in the bargaining unit and that issue is not material to these proceedings.) 3. The City and the Union are parties to a CBA for the period July 1, 1989 through June 30, 1992, continued to June 30, 1996 and operating under the status quo doctrine thereafter (Joint Exhibit No. 1 and Item 3 of pleadings and answers). Article 19 of that agreement is entitled "Grievance Procedure." Step IV of the grievance procedure calls for final and binding arbitration of disputes under the contract. Grievances are defined as "any difference as to the interpretation of this Agreement in its application to a particular situation, or as to whether it has been observed and performed, shall be a grievance under this agreement. ...?I 4. Article 18 of the CBA is entitled "Appointments,
Promotions and Demotions." Section A thereof calls 5. On August 4, 1996, the Chief issued a general order that a promotional exam for the rank of captain would be given by the Division of Fire Standards and Training in September and October. The written portion of that exam was given on September 13, 1996 and the oral portion on October 7, 1996. Lt. Gary Hargreaves and Lt. Michael Mansfield both took the exam. Mansfield had the highest score on the written exam and the second highest on the oral exam. Hargreaves was fifth on the written exam and third on the oral exam. (Items, 6, 7, 8 and 9 on pleadings and answer.) 6. Since 1989 and continuing during the time Mansfield took the captain's examinations, he was an employee of Fire Standards and Training in a part-time capacity, as "program coordinator," according to testimony from Richard Mason, Director of Fire Standards and Training (FSPT). Mansfield's employment at FSPT is contemplated under RSA 21-P-12-a (11) (g) since, according to Mason, his regular complement of seven full-time personnel is not sufficient to meet the training mandates of the agency. (Joint Exhibit No. 2.) Mason confirmed that Mansfield's part-time employment was regular and continual and that he could hire other part-time personnel on a limited basis. This did not include the ability to hire oral board personnel. 7. On or about October 8, 1996, both the Chief and Hargreaves learned the test results. Hargreaves challenged three questions on the written exam which delayed the receipt of his final promotional exam scores until November 14, 1996. Chief Navaroli testified before the arbitrator that this brought Hargreaves's score to fourth highest overall. 8. On December 6, 1996 Hargreaves filed a grievance with the
City which alleged that Mansfield's part-time employment with FSPT created a
conflict of interest in violation of Articles I and V of the CBA. Article I is
entitled "Purposes" and includes the need 'to continue the existing
harmonious relation- 9. The Union pursued the Hargreaves grievance through the
grievance procedure and to binding arbitration.
11. The City has brought this ULP seeking to vacate the
arbitrator's decision because he exceeded his authority as well as Articles 1
and 18-D of the contract. The Union claims the arbitrator acted both
within the DECISION AND ORDER Our analysis in this case involves three areas, the scope of the arbitration provisions as found at Article 19 of the CBA, the scope of the issue as framed by the parties for the arbitrator and the arbitrator's exercise of his authority. When we look at the provisions of Article 19, we find that
grievances are defined, by the parties, to mean "differences as to the
interpretation...or application..." of the contract. Article 18 then
proceeds, in more than five pages of single-spaced text, to describe in great
detail the procedures for promotions, testing eligibility, appointment
eligibility after testing, options when there are no qualified candidates, newly
created positions, position description questionnaires and a Promotion Criteria
Committee. In short, the detail of Article 18 suggests that the parties
considered its language with great precision, understood that they were creating
complicated and detailed procedures and wanted to preserve any appeals relating
to those procedures by way of the contract grievance machinery. Given the
breadth of the definition of a grievance and the detail of Article 18, we
believe that it can be said with "positive assurance" that the
parties' did not intend to exclude promotional procedures, as delineated in the
contract, from the grievance procedure. Appeal of Westmoreland School
Board, 132 N.H. 103 at 105 (1989). It is axiomatic that a party cannot be
required to submit matters to arbitration which it has not agreed to arbitrate. Steelworkers
V. Warrior & GulfNav. Co, , 363 U.S. 564 at 582 (1960). In this case,
our assessment is that the parties definitely intended that the Our second area of inquiry is the issue stipulated to the
arbitrator, as appears in Finding No. 9. The most important features of the
issues stipulated are twofold. First, the issues were agreed to and stipulated
by the parties, i.e., the parties agreed on what they wanted the arbitrator to
decide. Second, they used time-honored This brings us to the third area of inquiry, whether the arbitrator exceeded his authority. Given the breadth of the definition of a grievance and given the broad mandate conferred on the arbitrator to fashion a remedy if there was a finding that the CBA has been violated, we cannot and do not find that he exceeded the authority conferred on him by the parties when they negotiated the contract and when they framed the arbitration issues. He merely did the parties' bidding by deciding the issues presented in the context of the CBA. Accordingly, we find no basis to disturb the arbitration award and the ULP is DISMISSED. So ordered. Signed this 23rd day of April, 1998.
/s/ Jack Buckley By unanimous vote. Alternate Chairman Jack Buckley presiding. Members E. Vincent Hall and William F. Kidder present and voting.
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